[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-bugs] #4124 [Tor Bridge]: Bridges should use create_fast cells for the first hop of their circuits



#4124: Bridges should use create_fast cells for the first hop of their circuits
---------------------------+------------------------------------------------
    Reporter:  arma        |       Owner:                    
        Type:  defect      |      Status:  reopened          
    Priority:  normal      |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
   Component:  Tor Bridge  |     Version:                    
  Resolution:              |    Keywords:                    
      Parent:              |      Points:                    
Actualpoints:              |  
---------------------------+------------------------------------------------

Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:16 arma]:
 > Here's the patch for that. Note that in writing it I became convinced
 it's a poor idea.
 >
 {{{
 +     * guards, choose to stand out as a bridge rather than look like a
 +     * client, so the guard can't tell whether this circuit is from us
 +     * or from one of the users of our bridge, even though none of
 +     * our bridge users would extend a circuit to our guard since he
 +     * has the Guard flag. See bug 4124. */
 }}}

 It shouldn't be ânoneâ, but I agree that the probability that a bridge's
 client would extend to one of the bridge's entry guards is sufficiently
 low that using `CREATE_FAST` for ''every'' circuit originating from a
 bridge is acceptable.

 But I also don't see a problem with a bridge's entry guards knowing that
 it is a bridge, and I don't expect to be able to conceal that fact from
 them when we change Tor to shove a bridge's clients' circuits through the
 bridge's entry guards.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4124#comment:17>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs