[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-bugs] #4124 [Tor Bridge]: Bridges should use create_fast cells for the first hop of their circuits

#4124: Bridges should use create_fast cells for the first hop of their circuits
---------------------------+------------------------------------------------
    Reporter:  arma        |       Owner:                    
        Type:  defect      |      Status:  reopened          
    Priority:  normal      |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
   Component:  Tor Bridge  |     Version:                    
  Resolution:              |    Keywords:                    
      Parent:              |      Points:                    
Actualpoints:              |  
---------------------------+------------------------------------------------

Comment(by arma):

 Replying to [comment:17 rransom]:
 > It shouldn't be ânoneâ, but I agree that the probability that a bridge's
 client would extend to one of the bridge's entry guards is sufficiently
 low that using `CREATE_FAST` for ''every'' circuit originating from a
 bridge is acceptable.

 Right now we're in case 2b of network balancing:
 Sep 28 16:55:01.000 [notice] Computed bandwidth weights for Case 2b2
 (Wgg=1, Wee=1) with v10: G=1130211 M=467818 E=431139 D=1473927 T=3503095

 But yes, in the general case it might be 'few' rather than 'none'.

 > But I also don't see a problem with a bridge's entry guards knowing that
 it is a bridge, and I don't expect to be able to conceal that fact from
 them when we change Tor to shove a bridge's clients' circuits through the
 bridge's entry guards.

 We could in theory have bridges shove their clients' circuits through some
 other set of guards, when the time comes.

 So, in conclusion, the plan here is to leave the patch in place, not
 revert, and close the ticket? And then open a fresh ticket to be the mommy
 ticket for our growing number of "make bridges harder to enumerate"
 issues.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4124#comment:18>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs