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Re: hostile node anonymity attack scenario
On Mon, 31 Jan 2005, Paul Forgey wrote:
> But that requires I trust the first node. Since the crypto starts
> between the attacker and my node, the attacker can decrypt my data,
> assuming that it can fool me into thinking it did extend operations.
The crypto starts on your computer. The tor instance you are running.
node 0 of your chain if you like to call it that.
> So now my question is now this. How can nodes, at any hop, not fool me
> into thinking they did extend operations when they really did not? Does
> does my node have public key knowledge of ALL possible nodes it can
> route through?
Your onion router has knowledge of all nodes, yes.
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