[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: hostile node anonymity attack scenario
Your point being the strength of the anonymity depends on the number of
nodes. If there were, say, 2000 nodes, then one would have to create
almost 8 billion connections. It is encouraging to know the level of
effectiveness increases geometrically with the number of new nodes
Geoffrey Goodell wrote:
A more interesting question to ask might be, "what happens if a client
creates N independent connections through the network, over a long
period of time so that circuits are not reused?" If a malicious
operator possesses only three nodes, and N is sufficiently large (i.e.
greater than n*(n-1)*(n-2), where n is the number of Tor nodes), then
chances are, the attacker would be able to break the anonymity of at
least one connection...