Thus spake Maxim Kammerer (mk@xxxxxx): > On Wed, Jan 25, 2012 at 21:34, Mike Perry <mikeperry@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > JonDos has something of a bad reputation in the Tor community because of > > the "backdoor" Karsten and Robert mentioned. I think that against > > adversaries like organized crime and oppressive governments, this > > property can be a dangerous one for both users and node operators. > > Can any of you clarify this please? JonDonym's Wikipedia page [1] > claims that no backdoor was ever installed in running MIX routers. > What can be done to JonDonym (software or network) that can't be done > to Tor? > > [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Anon_Proxy#Privacy Please see other replies, but the "backdoor" in question is: https://anonymous-proxy-servers.net/en/law_enforcement.html Tor does not have this backtrace capability. I have not inspected the underlying implementation, but if it is retroactive, it seems vulnerable to rubber hose cryptanalysis (and possibly even if not): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis This property also prevents JonDos entry and middle nodes from being "hassle free", as is the case with Tor. -- Mike Perry
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