Re: [tor-talk] .onion name gen

[Scfith Rise up <scfith@xxxxxxxxxx>]

It _would_ be the same private key. Good luck with generating 1.2 septillion permutations (16^32). 

But could be doable in a few years so to answer your question, I believe there can only be one published in the HSDIR, so first come first served. Facebook's would have to be DDOS / shutdown and then the forged one can be spun up and published. 

Please correct me if I'm wrong as I've only been researching Tor since 2015. 

> On Mar 4, 2016, at 3:23 PM, Mirimir <mirimir@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
>> On 03/04/2016 01:03 PM, Andreas Krey wrote:
>>> On Fri, 04 Mar 2016 19:55:01 +0000, Flipchan wrote:
>>> IF i generate a .onion domain , isnt there a risk that someone can generate the same domain? I mean anyone can generate .onion domains and IF i got an easy .onion address then some could easily generate that rsa key right?
>> 
>> There is no 'easy' onion address, only ones that look like they
>> are. Faking facebookcorewwwi takes the same effort as any other.
>> Getting an onion that starts with facebook but does not end in
>> corewwwi is much easier (by the factor 1099511627775), but that
>> is true for any other eight character prefix as well.
>> 
>> Andreas
> 
> OK, but let's say that someone got facebookcorewwwi.onion, running
> scallion on some mega-GPU monster. It's hugely improbable, I know. And
> they'd have a different private key, of course. But how would Tor handle
> that? Would it work like running multiple onion copies does now? That
> is, would they compete for HSDir priority?
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