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Re: [tor-talk] VPNGate



On Mon, 2 Sep 2013 05:27:45 -0400
grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> You chose to provide last hop services (whether exit or vpn), any trouble
> you catch does not depend on deniability of the source.

Tor exit nodes can't help in finding the anonymized originator of an illegal
communication, so to speak. Everyone knows exit nodes are still several Tor
hops away from the real source, so by strong-handing or infiltrating an exit
node you can't really deanonymize those who exit through it. So there is very
low value in doing so, compared to the required effort and other expense.

Single-hop proxies on the other hand, can store logs (and this is the
recommended set-up of VPNGate), or can be forced to cooperate and install
tracking software which will reveal the originator's IP address next time they
connect. So they are an order of magnitude higher value target to pursue via
legal or not so legal ways if you want to deanonymize their users.

...i.e. muuuch more likely to cause problems to whoever hosts them.

-- 
With respect,
Roman

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