[freehaven-cvs] run it through ispell

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/rta04
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/freehaven/doc/rta04

Modified Files:
	nato-rta04.tex 
Log Message:
run it through ispell


Index: nato-rta04.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/rta04/nato-rta04.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -d -r1.2 -r1.3
--- nato-rta04.tex	7 Jan 2004 22:40:59 -0000	1.2
+++ nato-rta04.tex	7 Jan 2004 22:46:29 -0000	1.3
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
 location is known may be vulnerable to physical attack and denial of
 service.
 
-Onion Routing is on overlay network concept for making anonymous
+Onion Routing is an overlay network concept for making anonymous
 connections resistant to eavesdropping and traffic analysis.  It
 permits low-latency TCP-based communication such as web traffic,
 secure shell remote login, and instant messaging. The current design
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
 Because Onion Routing is an overlay network, it can exist on top of
 public networks such as the Internet without any modification to the
 underlying routing structure or protocols.  Beyond protecting data
-confidentiality and integrity, the Onion Routing protcol hides the
+confidentiality and integrity, the Onion Routing protocol hides the
 endpoint of each transmission. An
 intelligence analyst surfing a web site through Onion Routing is
 hidden both from that web site and from the Onion Routing network
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@
 introducing comparatively large and variable latencies.  Because of
 this decision, these \emph{high-latency} networks resist strong global
 adversaries, but introduce too much lag for interactive tasks like web
-browsing, internet chat, or SSH connections.
+browsing, Internet chat, or SSH connections.
 
 Tor belongs to the second category: \emph{low-latency} designs that
 try to anonymize interactive network traffic. These systems handle a
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
 must be provided by an external service.
 
 \textbf{Not steganographic:} Tor does not try to conceal who is connected
-to the network by someone in a postion to observe that connection.
+to the network by someone in a position to observe that connection.
 
 \subsection{Threat Model}
 \label{subsec:threat-model}
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@
 of the system itself.  Like usability, public perception is a
 security parameter.  Sadly, preventing abuse of open exit nodes is an
 unsolved problem, and will probably remain an arms race for the
-forseeable future.  The abuse problems faced by Princeton's CoDeeN
+foreseeable future.  The abuse problems faced by Princeton's CoDeeN
 project \cite{darkside} give us a glimpse of likely issues.
 
 \subsection{Directory Servers}
@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@
 the relative importance of these bottlenecks.
 
 \emph{Bandwidth classes:} This paper assumes that all ORs have
-good bandwidth and latency. We should instead adopt the Morphmix model,
+good bandwidth and latency. We should instead adopt the MorphMix model,
 where nodes advertise their bandwidth level (DSL, T1, T3), and
 Alice avoids bottlenecks by choosing nodes that match or
 exceed her bandwidth. In this way DSL users can usefully join the Tor

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