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[freehaven-cvs] clean up section 1
Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/rta04
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/freehaven/doc/rta04
Modified Files:
nato-rta04.bib nato-rta04.tex
Log Message:
clean up section 1
Index: nato-rta04.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/rta04/nato-rta04.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.1
retrieving revision 1.2
diff -u -d -r1.1 -r1.2
--- nato-rta04.bib 7 Jan 2004 22:35:44 -0000 1.1
+++ nato-rta04.bib 8 Jan 2004 05:46:12 -0000 1.2
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+@Book{diffiebook,
+ author = {Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau},
+ title = {Privacy On the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and
+ Encryption},
+ publisher = {MIT Press},
+ year = 1998
+}
+
@Misc{tor-design,
author = {Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson},
title = {Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router},
Index: nato-rta04.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/rta04/nato-rta04.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.3
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -d -r1.3 -r1.4
--- nato-rta04.tex 7 Jan 2004 22:46:29 -0000 1.3
+++ nato-rta04.tex 8 Jan 2004 05:46:12 -0000 1.4
@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@
\title{Resisting Traffic Analysis on Unclassified
Networks\thanks{This work supported by DARPA and ONR.}}
-% Putting the 'Private' back in 'Virtual Private Network
\author{Roger Dingledine \\ The Free Haven Project \\ arma@freehaven.net \and
Nick Mathewson \\ The Free Haven Project \\ nickm@freehaven.net \and
@@ -61,8 +60,8 @@
\begin{abstract}
While the need for data and message confidentiality is well known,
- the need to protect networks against traffic analysis is less widely
- recognized. Unclassified networks are subject to traffic analysis.
+ the need to protect against traffic analysis on networks, including
+ unclassified networks, is less widely recognized.
Tor is a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service
that resists traffic analysis. This second-generation Onion Routing
system adds to the first-generation design with perfect forward
@@ -78,21 +77,20 @@
%\textbf{Keywords:} anonymity, peer-to-peer, remailer, nymserver, reply block
%\end{center}
-
\section{Introduction}
It is well known that encryption hides the content of communication
but does nothing to hide who is communicating with whom. Indeed,
Whit Diffie, an inventor of public-key cryptography, has noted that
traffic analysis, not cryptanalysis, is the backbone of signals
-intelligence. %cite
+intelligence \cite{diffiebook}.
% Can we be more specific than 'the military'?
The military has many reasons to communicate over open
networks without revealing its communications partners.
-This assists intelligence gathering intelligence from open Internet
+This assists intelligence gathering from open Internet
sources, rapid formation of dynamic coalitions without an existing
-shared private infrastructure between members, and
-hidden communication with vendors to help conceal procurement
+shared private infrastructure between members, and
+private communication with vendors to help conceal procurement
patterns. Finally, it is sometimes not the communicants that are
sensitive but their location: a server whose physical or logical
location is known may be vulnerable to physical attack and denial of
@@ -102,25 +100,24 @@
connections resistant to eavesdropping and traffic analysis. It
permits low-latency TCP-based communication such as web traffic,
secure shell remote login, and instant messaging. The current design
-and implementation, Tor, makes a number of improvements on the
-original. %cite
-These include perfect forward secrecy, interfacing
-to unmodified applications via SOCKS,
-multiplexing of application connections on
-Onion Routing circuits, congestion control, recovery from node
-failure, integrity checking, and rendezvous points that protect the
-responder of a connection in addition to the initiator.
+and implementation, Tor, improves on the
+original \cite{or-ih96,or-jsac98,or-discex00,or-pet00} by providing
+perfect forward secrecy, interfacing to unmodified applications via
+SOCKS, multiplexing application connections on Onion Routing circuits,
+adding congestion control adding integrity checking, and including a
+rendezvous points design that protects the responder of a connection in
+addition to the initiator.
Onion Routing may be used anywhere traffic analysis is a concern.
Because Onion Routing is an overlay network, it can exist on top of
public networks such as the Internet without any modification to the
-underlying routing structure or protocols. Beyond protecting data
-confidentiality and integrity, the Onion Routing protocol hides the
-endpoint of each transmission. An
+underlying routing structure or protocols. In addition to protecting
+data confidentiality and integrity, the Onion Routing protocol hides
+the endpoint of each transmission. An
intelligence analyst surfing a web site through Onion Routing is
hidden both from that web site and from the Onion Routing network
itself. On the other hand, Onion Routing separates anonymity of the
-communication from that of the data stream. So, a procurement officer
+communication from that of the data stream. That is, a procurement officer
can place orders with a vendor and completely authenticate himself to
the vendor while still hiding the communication from any
observers---including compromised Onion Routing network components.
@@ -128,19 +125,17 @@
better protection and yet less redundancy than standard approaches to
distributed denial of service. In this paper we provide a brief
overview of the Tor design. More detailed description is given in
-\cite{tor-design}, from which much of the present paper was extracted.
+\cite{tor-design}, from which much of the present paper is extracted.
As we describe the system design, we will note how Onion Routing can
be used to protect military communications in the above described
settings.
\subsection{Related Work}
-Onion Routing did not arise in a vacuum.
-%In this summary we cannot
-%describe all of the related work that came before.
-We give here a
-broad description of prior work; for a fuller list of references and
-comparisons, see
-\cite{tor-design}. Modern anonymity systems date to Chaum's
+
+We give here a broad description of prior work; for a more complete list
+of references and comparisons, see \cite{tor-design}.
+
+Modern anonymity systems date to Chaum's
{\bf Mix-Net} design \cite{chaum-mix}. Chaum proposed hiding the
correspondence between sender and recipient by wrapping messages in
layers of public-key cryptography, and relaying them through a path
@@ -183,8 +178,8 @@
encryption. Because a circuit crosses several servers, and each
server only knows the adjacent servers in the circuit, no single
server can link a user to her communication partners. There have been
-many of these making a variety of design choices and we again refer
-the reader to \cite{tor-design} for more information.
+many circuit-based designs, making a variety of design choices; we again
+refer the reader to \cite{tor-design} for more information.
\section{Design goals and assumptions}
\label{sec:assumptions}
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