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[freehaven-cvs] some tweaks and fragments for an abstract
Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/freehaven/doc/routing-zones
Modified Files:
routing-zones.tex routing-zones.bib
Log Message:
some tweaks and fragments for an abstract
Index: routing-zones.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones/routing-zones.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.16
retrieving revision 1.17
diff -u -d -r1.16 -r1.17
--- routing-zones.tex 26 Jan 2004 23:45:51 -0000 1.16
+++ routing-zones.tex 27 Jan 2004 03:20:33 -0000 1.17
@@ -34,6 +34,14 @@
networks with respect to an adversary who observes the network edges.
We find that. We recommend that.
+We implement a recent invented technique to , and apply it experimentally
+against two deployed anonymity networks (Mixmaster and Tor)
+
+We define a \emph{jurisdictional independence} metric to characterize
+the robustness of a given anonymity network
+
+
+
\end{abstract}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
@@ -46,8 +54,8 @@
can passively observe large pieces of the Internet. Anonymity
networks aim to provide communications privacy for individuals or
groups on the Internet, but such networks are still vulnerable to powerful
-eavesdroppers. Against high-latency \emph{mix networks} such as Mixminion
-\cite{minion-design}, an adversary who observes a large volume of
+eavesdroppers. Against high-latency \emph{mix networks} such as Mixmaster
+\cite{mixmaster-spec}, an adversary who observes a large volume of
network traffic can notice over time that certain recipients are more
likely to receive messages after given senders have transmitted messages
\cite{disad-free-routes,statistical-disclosure,e2e-traffic}. Low-latency
@@ -59,7 +67,7 @@
Anonymity designs use three major strategies to mitigate these attacks.
\begin{tightlist}
\item {\bf{Batching and pooling:}} The network collects a group of input
-messages and reorders them before they exit, to prevent the adversary
+messages and reorders them before they exit, to hinder the adversary
from learning which message in the batch originated from a given sender
\cite{chaum81,trickle02}.
% (Of course, this only works if the system can tolerate some latency.)
@@ -86,7 +94,7 @@
network, so an adversary of a given strength sees less of the network
\cite{econymics,bennett:pet2003,morphmix:fc04}; by arranging the overlay
topology so messages can enter or exit at more places in the network
-(as opposed to a cascade topology~\cite{disad-free-routes});
+(compared to a cascade topology~\cite{disad-free-routes});
or by \emph{jurisdictional arbitrage} --- coordinating network behavior
so each transaction includes zones (i.e., jurisdictions) controlled by
several different adversaries.
@@ -98,13 +106,13 @@
taking advantage of the fact that the Internet is divided into thousands
of independently operated networks called {\em autonomous systems}
(ASes). By considering the topology of the underlying Internet routing,
-we can learn how vulnerable existing mix networks are to certain classes
+we can assess the vulnerability of existing mix networks to certain classes
of adversary. Specifically, we define a {\em jurisdictional
-independence metric} that reflects the probability that the path to the
+independence} metric that reflects the probability that the path to the
entry point of a mix network and the path from the exit point will
traverse the same AS. We then consider the node selection algorithms of
existing mix networks, such as Tor~\cite{tor-design} and
-Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster} and evaluate the independence metric for
+Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec} and evaluate the independence metric for
each of these networks.
We find that both Tor and Mixmaster have multiple mix nodes in the same
@@ -167,7 +175,7 @@
we treat the network as a black box and consider only the endpoints
(entry node and exit node) for each given transaction. Endpoint
attacks include simple timing and counting attacks against
-low-latency systems~\cite{SS03}, and long-term
+low-latency systems~\cite{defensive-dropping,SS03}, and long-term
intersection or disclosure attacks against high-latency systems
\cite{disad-free-routes,statistical-disclosure,e2e-traffic}.
@@ -180,7 +188,7 @@
(Bob).
Note that a successful endpoint attack against a high-latency system like
-Mixminion takes a lot more time and effort than a successful endpoint
+Mixmaster takes a lot more time and effort than a successful endpoint
attack against a low-latency system like Tor. Our work here is thus
more clearly applicable to low-latency systems; but because even an
observer of a few nodes may over time be able to break the anonymity of
@@ -714,15 +722,13 @@
%\section*{Acknowledgements}
+\bibliographystyle{plain}
+\bibliography{routing-zones}
\begin{appendix}
\section{Summary of Mix Networks}\label{sec:mixnode_summary}
\input{network-tables}
\end{appendix}
-
-\bibliographystyle{plain}
-\bibliography{routing-zones}
-
\end{document}
Index: routing-zones.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones/routing-zones.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.9
retrieving revision 1.10
diff -u -d -r1.9 -r1.10
--- routing-zones.bib 26 Jan 2004 23:45:51 -0000 1.9
+++ routing-zones.bib 27 Jan 2004 03:20:33 -0000 1.10
@@ -86,8 +86,8 @@
}
@inproceedings{defensive-dropping,
- title = {Stopping Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix-Based Systems},
- author = {Matthew Wright and Brian N. Levine and Michael K. Reiter and Chenxi Wang},
+ title = {Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix-Based Systems},
+ author = {Brian N. Levine and Michael K. Reiter and Chenxi Wang and Matthew Wright},
booktitle = {Financial Cryptography},
year = {2004},
editor = {Ari Juels},
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