[freehaven-cvs] initial cleanups after reading through it

[arma@xxxxxxxx]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing
In directory moria:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/alpha-mixing

Modified Files:
	alpha-mixing.tex 
Log Message:
initial cleanups after reading through it


Index: alpha-mixing.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing/alpha-mixing.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.3
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -d -r1.3 -r1.4
--- alpha-mixing.tex	9 Mar 2006 18:49:15 -0000	1.3
+++ alpha-mixing.tex	9 Mar 2006 23:31:37 -0000	1.4
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
 \usepackage{amsmath}
 \usepackage{epsfig}
 
-
 \renewcommand\url{\begingroup \def\UrlLeft{<}\def\UrlRight{>}\urlstyle{tt}\Url}
 \newcommand\emailaddr{\begingroup \def\UrlLeft{<}\def\UrlRight{>}\urlstyle{tt}\Url}
 \newcommand\XXXX[1]{{\small\bf [XXXX #1]}}
@@ -58,12 +57,12 @@
 design a hybrid batching strategy that tries to put both user bases
 into the same network but still let them achieve their goals.
 
-The basic concept of the scheme is as follows: The sender communicates
+In our scheme, the sender communicates
 an alpha -- a security parameter -- to each mix along the route of the
 message. The time the message spends inside each mix and hence the
 anonymity it accumulates then depends on the size of the security
-parameter and, optionally on a few other key variables such as the
-traffic level in the network, (the number of messages inside the mix)
+parameter, and optionally on a few other key variables such as the
+traffic level in the network, the number of messages inside the mix,
 or a random number chosen by the mix.
 
 %Alice gives each message an alpha (number of rounds) delay to each mix
@@ -74,24 +73,24 @@
 %messages that enter with alpha $>0$ get put into the buffer with alpha
 %of that number.
 
-The key observation is that since we assume that the attacker knows
+The key observation is that when the attacker knows
 little about the security parameters chosen by the individual users,
-everyone can benefit from the mere possibility of doing so, and indeed
-any users which desire better anonymity have the opportunity to obtain
+everyone can benefit from the mere possibility of doing so. Further,
+users that desire better anonymity have the opportunity to obtain
 it by increasing alpha.
 
 %Here we also need to say that the attacker does not have complete
 %knowledge of the alphas in the messages, and this is what we are
 %relying on, see the analysis section.
 
-In this paper we proceed as follows: first, we outline the very simple
-alpha mixes and analyse the anonymity properties which they can
-provide to users with different security preferences. Secondly, we
-look at the strategies the users should follow when picking their
+In this paper we proceed as follows: we start by outlining some simple
+alpha mix designs and analyse what anonymity properties they can
+provide to users with different security preferences. Next we
+look at what strategies users should follow when picking their
 security parameters (recall that one is needed for each mix in the
-route of the message).  Thirdly, we look at more sophisticated alpha
+route of the message).  Last, we look at more sophisticated alpha
 mixing strategies which should provide better properties but are hard
-to analyse. Finally we conclude.
+to analyse.
 
 AAS: this should all hopefully be in the paragraph above.
 \subsection{Outline}
@@ -177,7 +176,7 @@
 We will describe anonymity for a threshold mix. As we have already
 noted, we assume a steady-state network in which messages arrive at
 the different alphas for the mix at a regular rate, and the mix fires
-at regular intervals. Thus the threshold mix is indestinguishable by a
+at regular intervals. Thus the threshold mix is indistinguishable by a
 local external passive adversary from a timed mix.
 
 We assume the adversary does not know the specific alpha of any
@@ -218,7 +217,7 @@
 If the adversary knows the strategy (although not the actual
 $\alpha_0$) for each message, then the anonymity of a message is
 unaffected by the strategy for choosing $\alpha_0$ for other messages
-in a steady-state network. However, if the strategies are not know,
+in a steady-state network. However, if the strategies are not known,
 then choosing $\alpha_0$ from a broader range increases the anonymity
 for other messages in the mix as well, although it is difficult to say
 by how much. If the distribution of strategies across all
@@ -234,6 +233,7 @@
   at random from the range
   given by $0 \leq \alpha_{M,0} \leq k_{M,0}$.
   Then anonymity increases for any message $M$ in the mix if any
+% don't we mean 'for every message $M$'? -RD
   $k_{M',0}$ increases.
 \end{claim}
 
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@
 smaller anonymity set and the negative effect of advertising to
 participating mixes that the message is more sensitive.
 
-This tradeoff is not entirely avoidable, however, it is possible to
+This tradeoff is not entirely avoidable, but it is possible to
 move where the higher alphas occur within a messages path. If the mix
 adjacent to the sender (and receiver if that is also sensitive) is
 always given relatively low alpha messages, then the mixes that can

***********************************************************************
To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxx with
unsubscribe freehaven-cvs       in the body. http://freehaven.net/