[freehaven-cvs] recommit my changes

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Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing
In directory moria:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/alpha-mixing

Modified Files:
	alpha-mixing.tex 
Log Message:
recommit my changes


Index: alpha-mixing.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/alpha-mixing/alpha-mixing.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.5
retrieving revision 1.6
diff -u -d -r1.5 -r1.6
--- alpha-mixing.tex	10 Mar 2006 01:36:41 -0000	1.5
+++ alpha-mixing.tex	10 Mar 2006 02:03:04 -0000	1.6
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
 \usepackage{amsmath}
 \usepackage{epsfig}
 
-
 \renewcommand\url{\begingroup \def\UrlLeft{<}\def\UrlRight{>}\urlstyle{tt}\Url}
 \newcommand\emailaddr{\begingroup \def\UrlLeft{<}\def\UrlRight{>}\urlstyle{tt}\Url}
 \newcommand\XXXX[1]{{\small\bf [XXXX #1]}}
@@ -58,12 +57,12 @@
 design a hybrid batching strategy that tries to put both user bases
 into the same network but still let them achieve their goals.
 
-The basic concept of the scheme is as follows: The sender communicates
+In our scheme, the sender communicates
 an alpha -- a security parameter -- to each mix along the route of the
 message. The time the message spends inside each mix and hence the
 anonymity it accumulates then depends on the size of the security
-parameter and, optionally on a few other key variables such as the
-traffic level in the network, (the number of messages inside the mix)
+parameter, and optionally on a few other key variables such as the
+traffic level in the network, the number of messages inside the mix,
 or a random number chosen by the mix.
 
 %Alice gives each message an alpha (number of rounds) delay to each mix
@@ -74,26 +73,26 @@
 %messages that enter with alpha $>0$ get put into the buffer with alpha
 %of that number.
 
-The key observation is that since we assume that the attacker knows
+The key observation is that when the attacker knows
 little about the security parameters chosen by the individual users,
-everyone can benefit from the mere possibility of doing so, and indeed
-any users which desire better anonymity have the opportunity to obtain
+everyone can benefit from the mere possibility of doing so. Further,
+users that desire better anonymity have the opportunity to obtain
 it by increasing alpha.
 
 %Here we also need to say that the attacker does not have complete
 %knowledge of the alphas in the messages, and this is what we are
 %relying on, see the analysis section.
 
-In this paper we proceed as follows: first, we outline the very simple
-alpha mixes and analyse the anonymity properties which they can
-provide to users with different security preferences. Secondly, we
-look at the strategies the users should follow when picking their
+In this paper we proceed as follows: we start by outlining some simple
+alpha mix designs and analyse what anonymity properties they can
+provide to users with different security preferences. Next we
+look at what strategies users should follow when picking their
 security parameters (recall that one is needed for each mix in the
 route of the message).  Thirdly, we look at the incentives users have
 for increasing their security parameter vs expecting others to do so
 (and hence provide more anonymity to everyone). Then we consider more
 sophisticated alpha mixing strategies which should provide better
-properties but are hard to analyse. Finally we conclude.
+properties but are hard to analyse.
 
 %AAS: this should all hopefully be in the paragraph above.
 %\subsection{Outline}
@@ -178,7 +177,7 @@
 We will describe anonymity for a threshold mix. As we have already
 noted, we assume a steady-state network in which messages arrive at
 the different alphas for the mix at a regular rate, and the mix fires
-at regular intervals. Thus the threshold mix is indestinguishable by a
+at regular intervals. Thus the threshold mix is indistinguishable by a
 local external passive adversary from a timed mix.
 
 We assume the adversary does not know the specific alpha of any
@@ -235,6 +234,7 @@
   at random from the range
   given by $0 \leq \alpha_{M,0} \leq k_{M,0}$.
   Then anonymity increases for any message $M$ in the mix if any
+% don't we mean 'for every message $M$'? -RD
   $k_{M',0}$ increases.
 \end{claim}
 
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@
 %smaller anonymity set and the negative effect of advertising to
 %participating mixes that the message is more sensitive.
 
-%This tradeoff is not entirely avoidable, however, it is possible to
+%This tradeoff is not entirely avoidable, but it is possible to
 %move where the higher alphas occur within a messages path. If the mix
 %adjacent to the sender (and receiver if that is also sensitive) is
 %always given relatively low alpha messages, then the mixes that can

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