[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

[freehaven-cvs] more tweaks; break cites into .bib file



Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/wupss04
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/freehaven/doc/wupss04

Modified Files:
	usability.tex 
Added Files:
	usability.bib 
Log Message:
more tweaks; break cites into .bib file


--- NEW FILE: usability.bib ---
@InProceedings{sybil,
  author = "John Douceur",
  title = {{The Sybil Attack}},
  booktitle = "Proceedings of the 1st International Peer To Peer Systems Workshop (IPTPS)",
  month = {Mar},
  year = 2002,
}

@inproceedings{econymics,
  title = {On the Economics of Anonymity},
  author = {Alessandro Acquisti and Roger Dingledine and Paul Syverson},
  booktitle = {Financial Cryptography},
  year = {2003},
  month = {Jan},
  editor = {Rebecca N. Wright},
  publisher = {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2742},
}

@inproceedings{minion-design,
  title = {Mixminion: Design of a Type {III} Anonymous Remailer Protocol},
  author = {George Danezis and Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson},
  booktitle = {2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy},
  year = {2003},
  month = {May},
  publisher = {IEEE CS},
  pages = {2--15},
}

@InProceedings{web-mix,
   author =      {Oliver Berthold and Hannes Federrath and Stefan K\"opsell},
   title =       {Web {MIX}es: A system for anonymous and unobservable
                  {I}nternet access},
   booktitle =   {Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Workshop
                  on Design Issue in Anonymity and Unobservability},
   editor =       {H. Federrath},
   month = {Jul},
   publisher =    {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2009},
   year =        {2000},
}

@inproceedings{tor-design,
  author = "Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson",
  title = {{Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium},
  year = {2004},
  month = {Aug},
}

@InProceedings{danezis-pet2004,
  author = "George Danezis",
  title = "The Traffic Analysis of Continuous-Time Mixes",
  booktitle= {Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2004)},
  editor = {David Martin and Andrei Serjantov},
  month = {May},
  year = {2004},
}


Index: usability.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/wupss04/usability.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.9
retrieving revision 1.10
diff -u -d -r1.9 -r1.10
--- usability.tex	1 Nov 2004 10:44:00 -0000	1.9
+++ usability.tex	1 Nov 2004 11:03:29 -0000	1.10
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 
 \begin{document}
 
-\title{Anonymity Loves Company --\\ Usability and the Network Effect}
+\title{Anonymity Loves Company:\\ Usability and the Network Effect}
 \author{Roger Dingledine \\ The Free Haven Project \\ arma@freehaven.net \and
 Nick Mathewson \\ The Free Haven Project \\ nickm@freehaven.net}
 
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
 
 Usability is an important parameter in systems that aim to protect data
 confidentiality.  But when the goal is {\it privacy}, it can become even
-more important.  A large category of {\it anonymity networks}, such as
+more important.  A large category of {\it anonymizing networks}, such as
 Tor, JAP, Mixminion, and Mixmaster, aim to hide not only what is being
 said, but also who is
 communicating with whom, which users are using which websites, and so on.
@@ -131,9 +131,7 @@
 sets to more sophisticated measures based on the attacker's confidence.}
 Therefore, when more users join the network, existing users become more
 secure, even if the new users never talk to the existing
-ones!\footnote{``On the Economics of Anonymity''.  Alessandro Acquisti,
-  Roger Dingledine, Paul Syverson.  {\em Proceedings of the Seventh
-  International Financial Cryptography Conference}, January 2003.}
+ones! \cite{econymics}
 
 There is a catch, however.  For users to keep the same anonymity set, they
 need to act like each other.  If Alice's client acts completely unlike Bob's
@@ -287,10 +285,8 @@
 privacy itself.  What happens when these principles conflict?
 
 We encountered a situation like this when designing how the Mixminion
-anonymous email network\footnote{``Mixminion: Design of a type {III}
-  anonymous remailer protocol''.  George Danezis, Roger Dingledine,
-  and Nick Mathewson.  {\em Proc. 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and
-  Privacy}, pages 2--15.} should handle MIME-encoded data. MIME
+anonymous email network \cite{minion-design} should handle MIME-encoded
+data. MIME
 (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) is the way a mail client tells
 the receiving mail client about attachments, which character set was used,
 and so on. As a standard, MIME is so permissive and flexible that
@@ -350,12 +346,8 @@
 Usability and marketing have also proved important in the development
 of Tor, a low-latency anonymizing network for TCP traffic.  The technical
 challenges Tor has solved, and the ones it still needs to address, are
-described in its design paper\footnote{``Tor: The
-  Second-Generation Onion Router''.  Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson,
-  and Paul Syverson.  {\em Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security
-  Symposium}, August 2004.},
-but at this point many of the most crucial challenges are in adoption
-and usability.
+described in its design paper \cite{tor-design}, but at this point many
+of the most crucial challenges are in adoption and usability.
 
 While Tor was in it earliest stages, its user base was a small number of
 fairly sophisticated privacy enthusiasts with experience running Unix
@@ -406,9 +398,7 @@
 
 The Java Anon Proxy (JAP) is a low-latency anonymizing network for web
 browsing developed and deployed by the Technical University of Dresden
-in Germany.\footnote{``Web MIXes: A system for anonymous and unobservable
-  Internet access''. Oliver Berthold, Hannes Federrath, and Stefan
-  K\"opsell. {\em Proceedings of PET2000}, July 2000.} Unlike Tor, which
+in Germany \cite{web-mix}. Unlike Tor, which
 uses a \emph{free-route} topology where each user can choose where to
 enter the network and where to exit, JAP has fixed-route \emph{cascades}
 that aggregate user traffic into a single entry point and a single
@@ -426,9 +416,7 @@
 bytes from one end of the cascade to the other, it falls prey to the
 same end-to-end timing correlation attacks as we described above. That
 is, an attacker who can watch both ends of the cascade won't actually
-be distracted by the other users.\footnote{``The Traffic Analysis of
-  Continuous-Time Mixes''. George Danezis. {\em Proceedings of PET2004},
-  May 2004.} The JAP
+be distracted by the other users \cite{danezis-pet2004}. The JAP
 team has plans to implement full-scale padding from every user (sending
 packets all the time even when they have nothing to send), but ---
 for usability reasons --- they haven't gone forward with these plans.
@@ -514,8 +502,7 @@
 an attacker might sign up many users to artificially inflate the apparent
 size of the network. Not only does this \emph{Sybil attack} increase the
 odds that the attacker will be able to successfully compromise a given
-user transaction\footnote{``The Sybil Attack''. John Douceur. {\em
-  Proceedings of IPTPS02}, March 2002.}, but it might also trick
+user transaction,\cite{sybil}, but it might also trick
 users into thinking a given network is safer than it actually is.
 
 And finally, as we saw in the above discussion about JAP, it's hard to
@@ -555,6 +542,9 @@
 rights workers in oppressive countries are going to continue publishing
 their stories; witty finishing clause here.
 
+\bibliographystyle{plain}
+\bibliography{usability}
+
 \end{document}
 
 % Things we haven't talked about and maybe should:

***********************************************************************
To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo@seul.org with
unsubscribe freehaven-cvs       in the body. http://freehaven.net/