[freehaven-cvs] removed the crazy example

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03

Modified Files:
	econymics.tex 
Log Message:
removed the crazy example


Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.31
retrieving revision 1.32
diff -u -d -r1.31 -r1.32
--- econymics.tex	17 Sep 2002 00:48:02 -0000	1.31
+++ econymics.tex	17 Sep 2002 01:03:48 -0000	1.32
@@ -271,30 +271,11 @@
 \item  The number of users of the system is positively correlated to the
 level of anonymity of the system.
 
-\item  Acting as a node (which we represent as $a_{i}^{h}=1$, under the
-assumption that the honest node is interested in its own anonymity) is
-strongly positively correlated to preserving the anonymity of one's
-information. For example, suppose agents send messages at regular intervals
-%FIXME kill this example. it's bad news.
-(no more than one message per agent is sent to any incoming node at a time),
-that the probability of any node being compromised is $0.1$, and that
-messages pass through three nodes before exiting the network. Assume that
-routes are chosen at random unless the sender owns a node, in which case the
-sender uses his own node first and chooses the next two at random. If an
-agent does not run a node, the probability that he will by identified with
-certainty as the sender of a message that exits the mix network is $.001$.
-If an agent runs a mix node with batch threshold of $50$, then amongst
-messages leaving the mix-net a passive adversary can with certainty reduce
-the anonymity set (the set of possible messages that might be the sender's)
-only to $50$. And the probability of even doing that is the probability that
-all of the messages from the relevant batch pass only through bad nodes on
-the remaining two hops: $10^{-100}$. If we pessimistically equate the
-probability of guessing a message with the probability of identifying it
-with certainty, then the increase in anonymity achieved by running one's own
-node here is $2\times 10^{99}$.\footnote{%
-This example incorporates many simplifying assumptions, e.g., about patterns
-of sending messages and adversary passivity. Nonetheless, it should be clear
-that there is a large potential gain from running one's own node.}
+\item  Acting as an honest node improves anonymity. Senders who do not
+run a node may accidentally choose a dishonest node as their first hop,
+significantly decreasing their anonymity. Further, agents who run a
+node can undetectably blend their message into their node's traffic,
+so an observer cannot know even when the message is sent.
 
 \item  The relation between the number of nodes and the probability
 of remaining anonymous might not be monotonic. At parity of traffic,
@@ -858,9 +839,9 @@
 distributed trusted mixes, supported through entry-fees paid to a central
 authority and redistributed to the nodes.
 
-\item  \emph{Bilateral contracts}. Bilateral or multilateral contracts between
-agents can lead them to agree on cooperation, and on penalties for breaching
-cooperation.
+%\item  \emph{Bilateral contracts}. Bilateral or multilateral contracts between
+%agents can lead them to agree on cooperation, and on penalties for breaching
+%cooperation.
 
 \item  \emph{``Special'' agents}. Imagine having a ``special agent'' whose utility
 function considers the social value of having an
@@ -1139,14 +1120,12 @@
 before they can attract the high-sensitivity users. To attract this
 cover traffic, they may well have to address the fact that most users
 do not want (or do not realize they want) anonymity protection.
-\item Reputation has a complex but critical influence on node
-participation. We must investigate its role more thoroughly.
-\item High-sensitivity users have incentive to run nodes, so they can
-be certain their first hop is honest.
-\item There can be an optimal level of free-riding in decentralized
-anonymity systems, because there exist conditions under which
-high-sensitivity agents will opt to accept the cost of offering service
-to others in order to gain cover traffic.
+%\item Reputation has a complex but critical influence on node
+%participation. We must investigate its role more thoroughly.
+\item High-sensitivity agents have incentive to run nodes, so they can
+be certain their first hop is honest. There can be an optimal level of
+free-riding: in some conditions these agents will opt to accept the cost
+of offering service to others in order to gain cover traffic.
 \item While there are economic reasons for distributed trust,
 the deployment of a completely decentralized system might involve
 coordination costs which make it unfeasible. A central coordination

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