[freehaven-cvs] tighter phrasing

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03

Modified Files:
	econymics.tex 
Log Message:
tighter phrasing


Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.32
retrieving revision 1.33
diff -u -d -r1.32 -r1.33
--- econymics.tex	17 Sep 2002 01:03:48 -0000	1.32
+++ econymics.tex	17 Sep 2002 01:23:20 -0000	1.33
@@ -273,7 +273,9 @@
 
 \item  Acting as an honest node improves anonymity. Senders who do not
 run a node may accidentally choose a dishonest node as their first hop,
-significantly decreasing their anonymity. Further, agents who run a
+significantly decreasing their anonymity (especially in low-latency
+anonymity systems where end-to-end timing attacks are very hard to
+prevent). Further, agents who run a
 node can undetectably blend their message into their node's traffic,
 so an observer cannot know even when the message is sent.
 
@@ -816,9 +818,9 @@
 alternative mechanisms.
 
 \begin{enumerate}
-\item  \emph{Usage fee}. Imagine a scenario where each participant pays to use the system.
-The ``public good with free-riding'' problem above turns
-into a ``clubs'' scenario. Participating agents can choose a pricing
+\item  \emph{Usage fee}. If participants pay to use the system,
+the ``public good with free-riding'' problem turns
+into a ``clubs'' scenario. Agents can choose a pricing
 mechanism related to how much they expect to use the system or how sensitive
 they are. (The revelation principle \cite{fudenberg-tirole-91} indicates
 that the agent can concentrate on mechanisms where all the agents
@@ -835,48 +837,46 @@
 (there
 is a cost in the delay and the hassles of using the free service), and
 offers better service for money. With usage fees, the cost of being a node
-is externalized, and then paid to some entity. A hybrid solution involves
-distributed trusted mixes, supported through entry-fees paid to a central
+is externalized. A hybrid solution involves
+distributed trusted mixes, supported through entry fees paid to a central
 authority and redistributed to the nodes.
 
 %\item  \emph{Bilateral contracts}. Bilateral or multilateral contracts between
 %agents can lead them to agree on cooperation, and on penalties for breaching
 %cooperation.
 
-\item  \emph{``Special'' agents}. Imagine having a ``special agent'' whose utility
-function considers the social value of having an
-anonymous system, or who is paid or supported to provide such
-service. The risks here are congestion and non-optimal use of the resources 
+\item  \emph{``Special'' agents}. Such agents have a utility function
+which considers the social value of having an anonymous system, or are
+otherwise paid or supported to provide such service. The risks here are
+congestion and non-optimal use of the resources
 \cite{mackiemason-varian-95}.
 %FIXME why? how?
 
-\item  \emph{Public rankings and reputation}. The incentives regarding reputation
-can come in the form of wanting a higher reputation to get more cover
-traffic, but also as one of the rewards for the ``special agents'' above.
+\item  \emph{Public rankings and reputation}. A higher reputation
+not only attracts more cover traffic but is also a reward in itself.
 Just as the statistics pages for seti@home \cite{seti-stats} encourage
-participation, publically quantifying and ranking generosity creates an
-incentive to participate. Although incentives of public recognition and
-public good don't fit in our model very well, they are important because
-they help explain most actual current node operators.
-As discussed above, reputation can enter the
-utility function indirectly or directly (when agents value their reputation
-as a good itself).
+participation, publically ranking generosity creates an incentive to
+participate. Although the incentives of public recognition and public
+good don't fit in our model very well, they explain most actual current
+node operators. As discussed above, reputation can enter the utility
+function indirectly or directly (when agents value their reputation as
+a good itself).
 
 If we publish a list of mixes ordered by safety (based on number of messages
-each message is expected to be mixed with), the high-sensitivity users will
-gravitate to safe mixes, causing more traffic, and improving their safety
-further (and lowering the safety of other nodes). Based on our model the
-system will stabilize with one or a few remailers. One reason it won't
-stabilize in reality is because $p_a$ is influenced not just by $n_h$ but
+passing through the node), the high-sensitivity agents will
+gravitate to safe mixes, causing more traffic and improving their safety
+further (and lowering the safety of other nodes). In our model the
+system will stabilize with one or a few remailers. In reality, though,
+$p_a$ is influenced not just by $n_h$ but
 also by jurisdictional diversity --- a given high-sensitivity sender is
-happier with a diverse set of mostly safe nodes than with a set of very safe
-nodes run in the same zone. Another reason it may not stabilize is that at
-some threshold latency will begin to suffer, and the low sensitivity users will
-go elsewhere, taking away the nice anonymity sets.
+happier with a diverse set of mostly busy nodes than with a set of very busy
+nodes run in the same zone. Also, after some threshold of users latency
+will begin to suffer, and the low sensitivity users will go elsewhere,
+taking away the nice anonymity sets.
 
-More generally, a mix that chooses a frequent batching time may get lots of
-messages from the low sensitivity people, and thus end up providing \emph{%
-better} anonymity than one that fires only infrequently.
+More generally, a low-latency node may attract many low-sensitivity
+agents, and thus counterintuitively provide \emph{better} anonymity than
+one that waits to batch many messages for greater security.
 
 %\item  \emph{Micropayments for service}. Mojo Nation \cite{mojo} was
 %a peer-to-peer system for robustly distributing resources (e.g. file

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