[freehaven-cvs] more tightening; getting closer to 15 pages

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03

Modified Files:
	econymics.tex 
Log Message:
more tightening; getting closer to 15 pages


Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.33
retrieving revision 1.34
diff -u -d -r1.33 -r1.34
--- econymics.tex	17 Sep 2002 01:23:20 -0000	1.33
+++ econymics.tex	17 Sep 2002 01:40:50 -0000	1.34
@@ -306,32 +306,24 @@
 The possible costs include:
 
 \begin{enumerate}
-\item  Costs of using the system by:
-
-\begin{itemize}
-\item  sending messages:
-
-\begin{itemize}
-\item  through the mix-net system, $c_{s}$. This cost can include both
+\item  Costs of sending messages through the anonymous system, $c_s$,
+or through a non-anonymous system, $c_n$. These costs
+can include both
 direct financial costs such as usage fees, as well as implicit costs such as
-the time to build an anonymous message, learning curve to get familiar with
+the time to build and deliver messages, learning curve to get familiar with
 the system, and delays incurred when using the system. At first these delays
+through the anonymous system
 seem positively correlated to the traffic $n_{s}$ and negatively correlated
 to the number of nodes $n_{h}$. But counterintuitively, more messages per
 node might instead \emph{decrease} latency because nodes can process batches
 more often; see Section \ref{sec:alternate-incentives}. In addition, when
 message delivery is guaranteed, a node might always choose a longer route to
 reduce risk. We could assign a higher $c_{s}$ to longer routes to reflect
-the cost of additional delay.
-
-\item  or through a conventional non-anonymous system, $c_{n}$.
-
-The difference of $c_{s}$ and $c_{n}$ reflects the delay caused by using
-the mix-net system.
-\end{itemize}
-
-\item  receiving dummy traffic, $c_{r}$.
-\end{itemize}
+the cost of additional delay. 
+%In general,
+%the difference of $c_{s}$ and $c_{n}$ reflects the delay caused by using
+%the mix-net system.
+We also include here the cost of receiving dummy traffic, $c_r$.
 
 \item  Costs of acting as an honest node, $c_{h}$, by receiving and
 forwarding traffic, creating dummy traffic, or being an exit node (which
@@ -492,10 +484,6 @@
 (see for example \cite{rubinstein-82}) where the relative impatience of
 players plays an important role.
 
-also avoid a ``war of attrition/bargaining model'' framework (timing games
-(see for example \cite{rubinstein-82}) where the relative impatience
-of players plays an important role).
-
 \subsection{Adversary}
 
 Although strategic agents cannot choose to be bad nodes in this simplified
@@ -526,7 +514,7 @@
 for all agents. Users send messages at the same time, and only one message
 at a time. We also assume that routes are chosen randomly by users, so that
 traffic is uniformly distributed among the nodes.\footnote{%
-The consideration of reputation might alter this point. We comment on this in
+Reputation considerations might alter this point; see
 Section \ref{sec:alternate-incentives}.}
 
 If a user decides to be a node, her costs increase with the volume of
@@ -621,8 +609,7 @@
 $>-v_{i}\left( 1-p_{a}\left( \bar{n}_{s}+1,\bar{n}_{h},n_{d}\right) \right)
 -c_{s},$ and \\
 $-v_{i}\left( 1-p_{a}\left( \bar{n}_{s}+1,\bar{n}_{h},n_{d}\right) \right)
--c_{s}$ \\
-$<-v_{i}-c_{n}$%
+-c_{s}<-v_{i}-c_{n}$%
 \end{tabular}
 \end{equation*}
 then agent $i$ will choose to be an user of the system. Otherwise, $i$ will
@@ -677,7 +664,6 @@
 \begin{equation*}
 \begin{tabular}{cccc}
 {\tiny Agent i / Agent j} & $a_{j}^{h}$ & $a_{j}^{s}$ & $a_{j}^{n}$ \\
-other agent's type, but we then extend this case to study what happens when
 $a_{i}^{h}$ & $A_{i},A_{j}$ & $D_{i},B_{j}$ & $E_{i},C_{j}$ \\
 $a_{i}^{s}$ & $B_{i},D_{j}$ & $F_{i},F_{j}$ & $G_{i},C_{j}$ \\
 $a_{i}^{n}$ & $C_{i},E_{j}$ & $C_{i},G_{j}$ & $C_{i},C_{j}$%

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