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[minion-cvs] Add question about how to calculate KeyID.
Update of /home/minion/cvsroot/doc
In directory moria.seul.org:/tmp/cvs-serv10881
Modified Files:
minion-spec.tex
Log Message:
Add question about how to calculate KeyID.
Add comment about protocol string.
Index: minion-spec.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/minion/cvsroot/doc/minion-spec.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.33
retrieving revision 1.34
diff -u -d -r1.33 -r1.34
--- minion-spec.tex 21 Jun 2002 15:48:48 -0000 1.33
+++ minion-spec.tex 25 Jun 2002 11:51:23 -0000 1.34
@@ -207,6 +207,10 @@
we generate new keys.
-NM]
+[XXXX And by the way, how exactly do we compute a hash of a public
+ key? What encoding do we use? Do we just use the modulus, or must
+ we include 'e' as well? -NM]
+
A SWAP routing type tells the node to exchange headers as described below.
The EMAIL field in the SMTP routing type should be a valid mailbox
@@ -650,7 +654,7 @@
side only), so we needn't worry. -NM]
X.509 certificates need not be signed; instead, they must contain
-a key matching that used in the KEYID portion of the header's routing
+a key matching that used in the KEYIDportion of the header's routing
data.
Messages are sent from client to server; the client must send a
@@ -698,6 +702,13 @@
[XXXX This seems to imply that MMTP implementations must stay
backward compatible forever, or at least implement a contiguous set
of versions. Is this really so? -NM]
+[XXXX On further thought, this situation is unacceptable. I think that
+ A must send a comma-sepaarated list of protocol versions. Here's
+ why:
+ Suppose that we've published protocols 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2. Suppose
+ that 1.2 is better than 1.0, and 1.1 has turned out to be horribly
+ insecure. A client should be able to say ``PROTOCOL 1.0,1.2'' so
+ that it can cleanly refuse to support 1.1. -NM]
[XXXX BTW, is NL 'LF' or is it 'CRLF'? -NM]
* If B is not willing to use any protocol A supports, B closes the