[minion-cvs] Comments on abstract and sec1. Other sections will fol...

[nickm@seul.org (Nick Mathewson)]

Update of /home/minion/cvsroot/doc
In directory moria.seul.org:/tmp/cvs-serv20543

Modified Files:
	minion-design.tex 
Log Message:
Comments on abstract and sec1.  Other sections will follow.  Grep for XXXX or ????.

Index: minion-design.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/minion/cvsroot/doc/minion-design.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.80
retrieving revision 1.81
diff -u -d -r1.80 -r1.81
--- minion-design.tex	6 Nov 2002 02:57:07 -0000	1.80
+++ minion-design.tex	6 Nov 2002 03:26:29 -0000	1.81
@@ -54,20 +54,22 @@
 \pagestyle{plain} 
  
 \begin{abstract}
-
 We present Mixminion, a message-based anonymous remailer protocol with
 secure single-use reply blocks. Mix nodes cannot distinguish
 Mixminion forward messages from reply messages, so forward and reply
 messages share
 the same anonymity set. We add directory servers that allow users to
 learn public keys and performance statistics of participating remailers,
-and we describe nymservers that allow users to maintain long-term
+and we describe nymservers that provide long-term
 pseudonyms using single-use reply blocks as a primitive. Our design
 integrates link encryption between remailers to provide
 forward anonymity. Mixminion works in a real-world Internet environment,
 requires little synchronization and coordination between nodes, and
 protects against almost all known attacks.
-
+% ???? Can we say something stronger than 'against almost all known
+%      attacks?'  Maybe we can note that we protect against all known
+%      attacks at least as well as any other known system with our
+%      design parameters. -NM
 \end{abstract}
 
 \begin{center}
@@ -80,14 +82,18 @@
 \label{sec:intro}
 
 Chaum first introduced anonymous remailers over 20 years ago
-\cite{chaum-mix}. The research community has since introduced many new
+\cite{chaum-mix}.
+% ???? Did Chaum introduce anonymous remailers?  Weren't there
+%      penet-style things before mix-nets? -NM
+The research community has since introduced many new
 designs and proofs
 \cite{abe}\cite{babel}\cite{flash-mix}\cite{kesdogan}\cite{shuffle}\cite{hybrid-mix}, 
 and discovered a variety of new attacks 
 \cite{back-traffic-analysis}\cite{langos02}\cite{disad-free-routes}\cite{desmedt}\cite{mitkuro}\cite{raymond00}.
 But because many of the newer designs require considerable coordination or
 synchronization, deployed remailers still use Cottrell's Mixmaster
-design from 1994 \cite{mixmaster-attacks}\cite{mixmaster-spec}. Here we describe
+design from 1994 \cite{mixmaster-attacks}\cite{mixmaster-spec}. Here
+we describe
 Mixminion, a protocol for asynchronous loosely federated remailers that
 maintains Mixmaster's flexibility while addressing the following flaws:
 
@@ -126,12 +132,15 @@
 describe a protocol which allows recipients to opt out of receiving mail
 from remailers, but at the same time makes it difficult for an adversary
 to deny service to interested recipients.
+% XXXX Actually, Mixmaster allows nodes to -have- different policies:
+%      there's just not a good way to advertise your policies beyond 
+%      simple capabilities. -NM
 
 \item \textbf{Replay prevention and key rotation:} 
 If an adversary records the input and output batches of a mix and then
 replays a given message, that message's decryption will be exactly the
 same. Thus replayed messages completely break the security of the mix
-\cite{chaum-mix}. Mixmaster offers rudimentary replay prevention by
+\cite{chaum-mix}. Mixmaster offers replay prevention by
 keeping a list of recent message IDs --- but to keep the list from
 getting too long, it expires old entries. The adversary simply has to
 wait until the mix has forgotten about a
@@ -182,6 +191,9 @@
 %researchers and Mixmaster remailer operators. This design document
 %represents the first step in peer review of the Type III remailer
 %protocol.
+
+% XXXX Mention that we're type-III, and that Mixmaster v4 'will'
+%      support type-III? -NM
 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%