[tor-commits] r24676: {projects} Fix more minor issues (projects/articles/browser-privacy)

[Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@xxxxxxxxx>]

Author: rransom
Date: 2011-04-26 15:05:12 +0000 (Tue, 26 Apr 2011)
New Revision: 24676

Modified:
   projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex
Log:
Fix more minor issues

Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex
===================================================================
--- projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex	2011-04-26 15:04:37 UTC (rev 24675)
+++ projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex	2011-04-26 15:05:12 UTC (rev 24676)
@@ -343,17 +343,20 @@
 what is going on with respect to the user's relationship to the web.
 
 However, all current private browsing modes fall short of protecting against a
-network adversary and fail to deal with linkability against a network
+network-level adversary and fail to deal with linkability against such an
 adversary\cite{private-browsing}, claiming that it is outside their threat
 model\footnotemark. If the user is given a new identity that is still linkable
 to the previous one due to shortcomings of the browser, this approach has
 failed as a privacy measure.
+% XXXX Define network-level adversary.
 
-\footnotetext{The primary reason given to abstain from addressing the network
-adversary is IP address linkability. However, we believe this to be a red
+\footnotetext{The primary reason given to abstain from addressing a
+network-level
+adversary is IP-address linkability. However, we believe this to be a red
 herring. Users are quite capable of using alternate Internet connections, and
 it is common practice for ISPs in many parts of the world to rotate user IP
-addresses daily, to discourage servers and to impede the spread of malware.
+addresses daily, to discourage users from operating servers and to impede the
+spread of malware.
 This is especially true of cellular IP networks.}
 
 Linkability solutions within the identity framework would be similar to the

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