Re: [tor-dev] [Discussion] 5 hops rendezvous circuit design

[Roger Dingledine <arma@xxxxxxx>]

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 11:55:05AM -0500, Qingping Hou wrote:
>     (0) client fetches descriptor for a hidden service.
>     (1) client connects to introduction point.
>     (2) since client and HS are connected via introduction point, they can
>         negotiate a random number using this channel.
>         (For more details, see [RAND_NEGO])
>     (3) both client and HS maps that random number to a random onion router
>         using the same scheme, so they end up with the same node.
>         This is the candidate RP.
>     (4) both client and HS create a 3 hops circuit using RP as last hop.
>     (5) RP joins the circuit originates from HS to the circuit originates
>         from client.
>     (6) now client and HS are connected. Because their original circuits
>         share the same endpoint(the RP), the length of the path is 5 hops.

Worth discussing.

>         to the whole process. Firstly, it reuses the connection to introduction
>         point for both sides so it requires no extra circuits build up.
>         Secondly, the bottle neck is circuit setup, cell/stream transmission
>         delay is actually pretty low.

To be clear, the client is the one who learns first what the RP should
be, yes? That means:

A) The problem George brought up -- the client can keep doing this dance
until they agree upon an RP that the client controls, and now the HS
effectively has a two-hop path to the RP. Maybe that is ok (two is still
more than one), but it should be made clear.

B) The client should extend a circuit to RP first, establish a rendezvous
cookie there, and only then respond to HS with its R_a and rend cookie?
Otherwise there will be a race where both sides try to extend to RP, and
it's unspecified what happens if HS gets there first.

>     Note that at step 2), if HS is able to recover R_a from H(R_a), it can take
>     control over R_c. So to mitigate this, we can use a variant of
>     Diffie-Hellman handshake:
> 
>     (1) client generates a public key g^x and sends the digest H(g^x) to HS
>     (2) HS remembers H(g^x), generates a public key g^y and sends it back
>         to the client
>     (3) client receives g^y and sends back g^x to HS
>     (4) HS checks g^x against H(g^x) to make sure it's not generated after
>         client receives g^y.
>     (5) Now both client and HS compute a shared random number: R_c = g^(xy)

You're making both sides do public key operations just because the hash
function might be broken? I would guess the load, and DoS opportunities,
introduced by public key operations on the HS side will outweigh any
theoretical benefits here.

>     This is where hop negotiation come into play. A negotiated hop is
>     guaranteed to be a random node and cannot be determined by anyone.

For a single run this is true, but for the repeated game it's not. This
might be the killer flaw here.

>     a) How to design the scheme for mapping a random number to the same node
>        between client and server?

This one will indeed be tricky, since each side can have one of several
"currently valid" views of the network (i.e. consensus networkstatus
documents).

--Roger

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