Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Stop giving Exit flags when only unencrypted traffic can exit

[Paul Syverson <paul.syverson@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, Jan 06, 2016 at 10:21:31PM +1100, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> 
> > On 6 Jan 2016, at 21:26, Virgil Griffith <i@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > 
> > Tom, to ensure I understand you clearly, is your argument that
> > relays that export only unencrypted shouldn't get the Exit Flag
> > because insecure/unecrypted traffic "isn't what Tor is intended
> > for?" I want to be sure that I'm fully understanding your
> > proposal.
> 
> If adversaries can set up Exit relays that only permit
> insecure/unecrypted traffic, then they can inspect/interfere with
> all the traffic going through that Exit. As can any adversary that
> is on the upstream path from that Exit.
> 
> If we ensure that Exits must pass some encrypted traffic, then
> running an Exit is less attractive to an adversary. And even
> adversaries contribute useful, secure bandwidth to the Tor Network.

Modulo them not simply setting up an acceptable policy but then just
dropping all (much) actual traffic for the ports they didn't really
want.  (And correct attribution and sanctioning for non/incomplete
performing are hard.)  As always, if the adversarial goal is
monitoring, it is typically just easier (and not too expensive) to
genuinely provide the service that gets you the flags, but yes this
could still be an improvement vs. status quo.

aloha,
Paul




> 
> So this policy is intended to protect users, and encourage non-adversarial contributions to network bandwidth.
> (Given the small number of Exits flags affected by this change, I'm not sure if this policy is responsible for all the good Exits, or if our exit-checking tools are responsible.)
> 
> Tim
> 
> Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
> 
> teor2345 at gmail dot com
> PGP 968F094B
> 
> teor at blah dot im
> OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F
> 



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