Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Stop giving Exit flags when only unencrypted traffic can exit

[Virgil Griffith <i@xxxxxxxxx>]

I would argue that the existence of this longer policy discussion, with no obvious solution, is why it behoves us to separate policy (as much as possible) from Tor's core mechanism.

-V

On Wed, 6 Jan 2016 at 21:42 Peter Tonoli <peter+tor@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Quoting Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2345@xxxxxxxxx>:
> If we ensure that Exits must pass some encrypted traffic, then
> running an Exit is less attractive to an adversary.

I'd argue that it's marginally less attractive. They still have the
opportunity to inspect some unencrypted traffic.

> And even adversaries contribute useful, secure bandwidth to the Tor Network.

This could also potentially backfire: adversaries can create local
(non-tor) policies to throttle encrypted exit traffic, while not
throttling unencrypted traffic.

Peter..





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