Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 316: FlashFlow: A Secure Speed Test for Tor (Parent Proposal)

[Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, Apr 23, 2020 at 2:48 PM Matt Traudt <pastly@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>

Hi!  I've got some comments on the FlashFlow proposal; I'll start with
the ones that I think are most important, so that we can try to get
them out of the way.

First off, I'm concerned about the approach where measurers get to
consume a certain amount of bandwidth, with only a set fraction left
to devote to the background traffic.  It seems like a hostile set of
measurers could use this authority to introduce traffic patterns on
the network to assist in traffic analysis.  In general, having regular
scheduled and visible changes in relay capacity seem to me like they'd
help out traffic analysis a good deal.

Second, the "MSM_BG" information type also seems like a serious
traffic analysis risk.  It is, literally, telling the measurers a
report of how much traffic was sent each second on other connections.
Previously we decided that a much coarser summary than this was too
much information to publish in bandwidth-history lines, and I'm
worried not to see any analysis here.

{In both of the above cases we might say, "well, an attacker could do
that anyway!"  But to get the traffic information, an attacker would
need to compromise the upstream connection, and to introduce traffic
spikes the attacker would need to risk detection.  This proposal as
written would make both of these traffic analysis opportunities an
expected part of the infrastructure, which seems not-so-good to me.}

Third, I don't understand why we're using cell crypto here but we
aren't using RELAY cells or (apparently?) circuits.  Since TLS is
already in play, we'll already be measuring the relays' encryption
performance.  But if we do decide that cell crypto is needed, then
it's way easier to get that crypto happening if there are circuits
involved.  I think there's been some discussion of that on IRC; I'd
suggest that we try to make that work if we can.

Fourth, this approach to authenticating echo cell contents seems
needlessly complicated.  Instead of using random contents and
remembering a fraction of cells, it would make more sense for
measurers to use a keyed pseudorandom stream function to generate the
cells, and to verify the contents of all the cells as they come back
in.  (AES128-CTR and ChaCha8 and SHAKE128 all have nice properties
here.)

Fifth, using IP addresses for identification is NOT something we do on
the production network.  I think we should authenticate measurers by
identity key, not by IPv4 address (as is happening here, unless I
misunderstand.)

yrs,
-- 
Nick
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