Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 316: FlashFlow: A Secure Speed Test for Tor (Parent Proposal)

[Matt Traudt <pastly@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 6/2/20 3:01 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 23, 2020 at 2:48 PM Matt Traudt <pastly@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
> 
> Hi!  I've got some comments on the FlashFlow proposal; I'll start with
> the ones that I think are most important, so that we can try to get
> them out of the way.
> 
> First off, I'm concerned about the approach where measurers get to
> consume a certain amount of bandwidth, with only a set fraction left
> to devote to the background traffic.  It seems like a hostile set of
> measurers could use this authority to introduce traffic patterns on
> the network to assist in traffic analysis.  In general, having regular
> scheduled and visible changes in relay capacity seem to me like they'd
> help out traffic analysis a good deal.
> 
> Second, the "MSM_BG" information type also seems like a serious
> traffic analysis risk.  It is, literally, telling the measurers a
> report of how much traffic was sent each second on other connections.
> Previously we decided that a much coarser summary than this was too
> much information to publish in bandwidth-history lines, and I'm
> worried not to see any analysis here.
> 
> {In both of the above cases we might say, "well, an attacker could do
> that anyway!"  But to get the traffic information, an attacker would
> need to compromise the upstream connection, and to introduce traffic
> spikes the attacker would need to risk detection.  This proposal as
> written would make both of these traffic analysis opportunities an
> expected part of the infrastructure, which seems not-so-good to me.}
> 

Not just anyone can be a measurer. A bandwidth authority runs a
coordinator and chooses to trust some small number of measurers. In
practice, knowing the humans behind the dirauths today, I'd expect each
would only trust measurers they run themself.

> Third, I don't understand why we're using cell crypto here but we
> aren't using RELAY cells or (apparently?) circuits.  Since TLS is
> already in play, we'll already be measuring the relays' encryption
> performance.  But if we do decide that cell crypto is needed, then
> it's way easier to get that crypto happening if there are circuits
> involved.  I think there's been some discussion of that on IRC; I'd
> suggest that we try to make that work if we can.
> 

Yes the outcome of some IRC discussion with asn is that we should start
with MSM_ECHO cells being RELAY cells until we discover that is
untenable. The proposal will be updated to state this as well as clarify
that we'll be building circuits on which to send measurement traffic.

> Fourth, this approach to authenticating echo cell contents seems
> needlessly complicated.  Instead of using random contents and
> remembering a fraction of cells, it would make more sense for
> measurers to use a keyed pseudorandom stream function to generate the
> cells, and to verify the contents of all the cells as they come back
> in.  (AES128-CTR and ChaCha8 and SHAKE128 all have nice properties
> here.)
> 

The motivation here is to do everything possible to prevent measurers
from being a bottleneck before the relay, which was a problem for us in
prototyping. This final transition-able FlashFlow is starting out with
verifying all cells the normal way so we can see if this can of worms is
even necessary. I'm not optimistic.

> Fifth, using IP addresses for identification is NOT something we do on
> the production network.  I think we should authenticate measurers by
> identity key, not by IPv4 address (as is happening here, unless I
> misunderstand.)
> 

It's the short term deployment that we propose use IP addresses for
identification. At this point there's 1 FlashFlow deployment being
operated by us and measuring relays that have opted in to running our
patches (realistically: just us, but hopefully some adventurous
operators too). In the medium/long term coords/measurers will use proper
TLS identities that will be checked by the relays.

Maybe that's still unacceptable, but I just wanted to make that clear.

Matt
_______________________________________________
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev