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[tor-relays] Re: The attacker is back and bypassed the new anti-DoS mitigation



I have two relays I manage currently under attack. Both high egress. I get circuit creation request warnings to the tune of ~8000 per second, which leads me to believe this attack is exploiting that exact metric. This attack also seems to have the effect of poisoning ipset-based firewall rules likely when these circuit creations are passed down and cause node-to-node connections.

[WARN] Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! Please consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more restricted exit policy. [434537 similar message(s) suppressed in last 60 seconds]

I renew my call, _strenuously_, for exposing attacker IP's in the logs when these attacks are mitigated with rate limiting code. I advance to the assertion that not doing so is irresponsible of tor developers. If the BEGIN_DIR attack had been so logged when it was mitigated, those IP addresses gained in the days after the patch would give us a defense today.

I ma close to abandoning tor with all my nodes altogether.


On 2026-11-09 22:13, forest via tor-relays wrote:
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Hello.

Apparently, the attacker has returned and successfully stripped the
HSDir flag from two of my relays in a few hours. One attack saw high
asymmetric egress and one saw high asymmetric ingress (although not
nearly as much as the old attacks, so total bandwidth stayed about the
same). Both relays lost their HSDir flags as a result.

The high-ingress attack (100 Mbps in, 15 Mbps out) did not cause any
noticeable CPU increase but caused my entire swap partition to fill up
and caused severe thrashing. The high-egress attack (30 Mbps in, 130
Mbps out) only increased memory usage slightly but pegged the CPU at
100% the entire time.

As with the last attack, the MetricsPort and ControlPort become fully
unresponsive, preventing me from easily collecting diagnostics. I did
manage to get some metrics from the victim of the egress attack. Some
relevant samples are:

  tor_relay_traffic_bytes{direction="read"} 74109675909
  tor_relay_traffic_bytes{direction="written"} 130455336031

  tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor",action="processed"} 4345
tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor",action="dropped"} 64003920
  tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor_v3",action="processed"}
5449564
  tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor_v3",action="dropped"} 0

  tor_relay_streams_total{type="BEGIN"} 1
  tor_relay_streams_total{type="BEGIN_DIR"} 1710223

None of the "tor_relay_dos_total" samples fired. Version is 0.4.9.16.

Is anyone else experiencing this? Are there any mitigations?

Regards,
forest
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