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[tor-relays] Re: The attacker is back and bypassed the new anti-DoS mitigation



I run a single middle-only relay; the 0.4.9.16 build has definitely improved things for me!

Dawn

On Nov 10, 2026 at 12:11 PM, Red Oaive via tor-relays <tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

I have two relays I manage currently under attack.  Both high egress.  I 
get circuit creation request warnings to the tune of ~8000 per second,
which leads me to believe this attack is exploiting that exact metric.
This attack also seems to have the effect of poisoning ipset-based
firewall rules likely when these circuit creations are passed down and
cause node-to-node connections.

[WARN] Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation
requests! Please consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option
or choosing a more restricted exit policy. [434537 similar message(s)
suppressed in last 60 seconds]

I renew my call, _strenuously_, for exposing attacker IP's in the logs
when these attacks are mitigated with rate limiting code. I advance to
the assertion that not doing so is irresponsible of tor developers. If
the BEGIN_DIR attack had been so logged when it was mitigated, those IP
addresses gained in the days after the patch would give us a defense
today.

I ma close to abandoning tor with all my nodes altogether.


On 2026-11-09 22:13, forest via tor-relays wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
> Hello.
>
> Apparently, the attacker has returned and successfully stripped the
> HSDir flag from two of my relays in a few hours. One attack saw high
> asymmetric egress and one saw high asymmetric ingress (although not
> nearly as much as the old attacks, so total bandwidth stayed about the
> same). Both relays lost their HSDir flags as a result.
>
> The high-ingress attack (100 Mbps in, 15 Mbps out) did not cause any
> noticeable CPU increase but caused my entire swap partition to fill up
> and caused severe thrashing. The high-egress attack (30 Mbps in, 130
> Mbps out) only increased memory usage slightly but pegged the CPU at
> 100% the entire time.
>
> As with the last attack, the MetricsPort and ControlPort become fully
> unresponsive, preventing me from easily collecting diagnostics. I did
> manage to get some metrics from the victim of the egress attack. Some
> relevant samples are:
>
> tor_relay_traffic_bytes{direction="read"} 74109675909
> tor_relay_traffic_bytes{direction="written"} 130455336031
>
> tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor",action=""} 4345
> tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor",action=""}
> 64003920
> tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor_v3",action=""}
> 5449564
> tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor_v3",action=""} 0
>
> tor_relay_streams_total{type="BEGIN"} 1
> tor_relay_streams_total{type="BEGIN_DIR"} 1710223
>
> None of the "tor_relay_dos_total" samples fired. Version is 0.4.9.16.
>
> Is anyone else experiencing this? Are there any mitigations?
>
> Regards,
> forest
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