Re: Cover Traffic

[glymr <glymr_darkmoon@xxxxxxx>]

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i think it could probably help counter traffic analysis quite a bit if
say one out of ten packets is sent out of order, and would only
marginally increase latency and would not affect bandwidth at all.
some study would need to be done to determine exactly what proportion
of disordering of the scheduler is required to make timing attacks
less effective, or preferably if possible, near to impossible to perform.

2600denver wrote:
> Perhaps the server could insert short (randomized) delays between
> recieving a request and relaying it.
>
> On 4/15/06, *Paul Syverson* <syverson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> <mailto:syverson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>
>     On Sat, Apr 15, 2006 at 07:30:48PM +0200, Nils Vogels wrote:
>     > On 4/15/06, 2600denver < 2600denver@xxxxxxxxx
>     <mailto:2600denver@xxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>     > >
>     > > Does this seem like a plausable solution to stop timing and
>     point-to-point
>     > > attacks?
>     >
>     > Yes it most probably does,
>
>     Actually, no it doesn't
>     http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#YouShouldPad
>
>     And such attacks can be real
>     http://www.onion-router.net/Publications.html#locating-hidden-servers
>
>     >  but it also effectively slows down the
>     > entire Tor network bij 66%, at least when you are counting the
>     cover
>     > traffic in the bandwidth limits that you set for tor traffic.
>     >
>
>     Yep.
>
>     -Paul
>
>

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