[Fixed topposting so conversation can flow.] On Fri, Apr 28, 2006 at 03:05:44PM -0700, Ringo Kamens wrote: > On 4/28/06, Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >I'd like to register a small objection: while (absent countermeasures) > >correlation attacks work, it remains to be proven whether or not you > >can improve security significantly while adding only a small, > >tolerable, amount of padding and delay. > > Here's an example where cover traffic is good. If somebody has access to > servers and is trying to correlate users to traffic, and some users have > cover traffic then those users will ALWAYS show up as the users who are > using traffic at the same time and thus it is harder to track them down. I think you misread me; I didn't say, "cover traffic never helps." I said, "nobody knows whether a little bit of cover traffic helps much." This defense you describe (usually called "constant-rate padding") works if the users in question are always sending at the same rate and at the same pattern. But this means that if they *ever* want, say, a 10kpbs download, they must *constantly* generate 10kpbs worth of traffic, which is quite expensive for the network to deal with. Also, if their computers sometimes crash, they're in trouble, since they're not "always on" any more: see http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#e2e-traffic . Now, it is *possible* that there is a system like this where you can get good effects with just a little big of extra cover traffic. It is also possible, however, that there isn't one. Nobody has done the experimentation and analysis to prove either way. yrs, -- Nick Mathewson
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