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Re: Proposal: Tor User Agent Carousel (TUAC)

On Apr 4, 2008, at 12:10 PM, lxixnxenoise@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
hi, thank you for your reply, my comments follow below:

On Apr 4, 2008, at 11:16 AM, lxixnxenoise@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
Hi, thank you for the reply!

"Also, when the user agent changes on a website that you logged
onto, they
are going to link the two"

This is a good point, if the rotation occurs during the period of
but one may choose a longer period between rotations, this still not
solving anything though if the user is logged in somewhere. If the
user is
logging in somewhere, though, are the maintaining a static identity?
so, why? Would this not be a defeat in and of itself over a long
period of
time, regardless of UA?

Aside from this, would they not link more from the browser than UA?
So we
have two groups if we look at this simply, as a lot of tor users
seem to
like using the popular Windows UA:

Group 1: The real Windows users with the UA, most plugins enabled by
default, flash, javascript, etc.

Group 2: The tor users with the common Windows UA, most or all plugins

So group one is Charlie Brown in the standard t-shirt which never
and group two is Charlie Brown in the same t-shirt but with a
football in
his hands, the disabled plugins standing out.

So in addition to the TUAC idea (which, despite my naming of it, you
mentioned has already been suggested, which doesn't surprise me) I

A way to safely spoof (without a negative result to either end) to the
websites that you have plugins enabled, java, javascript, Flash, and
of the rest, but somehow negating the incoming trasmission of said
by passing it into some type of virtual shredder, some type of /dev/
approach. In this way Charlie Brown would not be holding the
football in
being fingerprinted so easily.

Thank you for your other useful comments, I have removed them from my
reply to save space since I have no comments to share on them.

If this is offtopic since it does not directly have to do with tor
as you
have pointed out, I will take the suggestion to others instead.
Thanks for
your kind attention! :)

I don't have much to say to that, except that you stick out as a Tor
user because your request came through a tor server. The list of tor
servers is publicly accessible (which is necessary by design) and even
if you don't spoof anything you're still not the regular Charlie
Brown. You need to "blend in" with the other Tor users, as you cannot
blend in with anyone on the planet!

Okay, though I would appreciate other people's comments then on my
suggestions for safely spoofing an enabled set of plugins if this could be done. Yes, one may easily stick out as a Tor user because of the exit node IP, *if* they are connecting to the end point through the exit node. Some
tor users choose to go through additional hoops rather than expose the
exit node IP, thus in this case they are NOT identified as a tor user.

Whether or not the tor user hits the website with the exit node IP, why should they further subject themselves to being labeled as a tor user? Why
would they want to blend into this small group of users? I would think
they would want to further blend into the larger group of common folk who
most often have their plugins enabled. Because of this I believe some
method should be implemented to safely spoof plugins being enabled when
they are disabled.

Maybe you can't blend in with everyone, but I'd rather choose to blend in with the commoners or others (that's the point of the common UA, right?)
than the rest of the tor users.

I don't want to spam the list, but I think it's remarkable how you still don't acknowledge that it doesn't help to tell websites you have plugins enabled... They will for example test for JS, and if it doesn't work, they already know something. Then they'll put an applet or Flash up - that doesn't connect back - wow, they figured out you're a Tor user.

also, this will hurt the general user experience - websites that detect you don't have JS enabled might direct you to a page that doesn't use it, while what you see else is totally useless. So I don't think this would become the default, which means again you don't only stick out because you're a Tor user, but also because you use a feature few others don't use.

But I will not respond until someone else has had the chance to reply and say what they think.

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