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Re: getting more exit nodes

--- Andrew <tor@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Roger Dingledine schrieb:
> >   adding much additional anonymity. (Or is it?)
> I believe this to be the most interesting
> question... since the user 
> does not know his connection will be relayed via a
> client-exit, there 
> will only be encryption up until the last relay (the
> one advertising 
> itself as an exit). Therefore, even if you
> re-encrypt the data for 
> transfer to the client-exit, it will now be *two*
> hops being able to 
> read the user's traffic in cleartext.
> I don't think that's an improvement... I'd even go
> as far as saying it's 
> the exact opposite of what we want.

While your analysis is correct (two potentially
unencrypted hops), the encryption concerns in
themselves should be irrelevant to the concerns of
Tor is not an encryption technology.  The only reason
for encrypting the other hops is for anonymity so that
each hop only knows about its immediate peers.  The
question is whether an unencrypted last leg affects
anonymity?  Plain text communication after tor should
already be considered compromised and if this leg were
unencrypted it should not be considered an additional
plain text compromise.


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