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Re: PrivacyNow is a BadExit (was Re: PrivacyNow node has misconfigured OpenDNS account)

On Apr 15, 2010, at 9:11 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:

On Thu, 15 Apr 2010 08:25:07 +0200 Sebastian Hahn <mail@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx >
On Apr 15, 2010, at 8:17 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:
Unfortunate (IMO), the latest versions have the support for .exit
either disabled or deleted, apparently leaving us no easy way to
such tests.  I've asked recently on this list whether some other
easy way
were available, but have been met with silence, so I assume that there
still is none.

If you want the functionality, feel free to set the AllowDotExit
config option
to 1. Note that this can't be recommended, because it opens you up for

That is what I have been doing in order to be able to test for exit
misbehavior.  However, the ChangeLog notes under "Minor bugfixes" for the following:

	- Resume handling .exit hostnames in a special way: originally we
	stripped the .exit part and used the requested exit relay. In we stopped treating them in any special way, meaning
	if you use a .exit address then Tor will pass it on to the exit
	relay. Now we reject the .exit stream outright, since that behavior
	might be more expected by the user. Found and diagnosed by Scott
	Bennett and Downie on or-talk.

I understood the "Now we reject" part as meaning that the .exit support had been completely removed. I do not understand why that behavior "might be more expected by the user." In any case, the above note is why I've paused at while waiting to discover some fairly easy-to-use alternative
method of testing exit behavior.

Ah no, that's not what is meant here. The idea is that when .exit is disabled,
we reject connections to some domain ending in .exit, instead of passing
that URL to the exit node. This is more expected behaviour because there
is no .exit tld currently, so people telling to to go to xyz.exit are most likely thinking that they are talking to a tor with the .exit functionality enabled.

attacks where the exit node can choose who your exit is going to be,
unless you use encrypted protocols when webbrowsing only.

Regarding the attack route you mention, I have some firefox plug- ins like NoRedirect and RefreshBlocker installed in addition to the recommended plug-ins (including QuickJava, NoScript, and Torbutton especially) that should help with automated stuff, and I'm in the habit of checking the actual URLs in links before using the links manually. In many cases, I don't even use firefox to get stuff from the links, but rather do a copy-and-paste to a wget(1) or some other downloader command in an xterm(1), so I have plenty of opportunity to notice that sort of interference. If those strategies still
miss something, please do let me know.

I suppose you still load images and possibly other resources, too;
those can be fetched from arbitrary locations unless disabled via
special-purpose addons like RequestPolicy.

# This file was generated by Tor; if youedit it, comments will not
be pres=

   I think the comment may be a lie.  It's most likely a torrc
produced by
vidalia, not tor.  (Someone please correct me if I've forgotten some
case in which tor does rewrite a torrc.)

I think it is more likely that the file was written by Tor, via the
torctl command.

Okay, I guess I had forgotten tor implemented such a command, but who
is issuing the command?  Vidalia?
    Thanks for the information, Sebastian.

Yes, Vidalia as the only Tor controller in a typical setup would be issuing
the saveconf command.

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