Re: [tor-talk] anonymity at the outset

[eli <ea@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Thanks, Roger, for the illustration - it's a great help to me and also
helpful in my explaining to others why I stay so many nights messing
around with Tor. As soon as I get a chance to improve the readability of
the orange and white labels, I'm gonna print it out and put it on the wall.

Your links led me to the discussion of incentives.  Anticipating a
following post, I'm wondering if a useful incentive might be to develop
criteria of bridge reliability and then use that to offer bridge
operators promotion to the portable transports list? - eliaz

On 4/15/2013 4:45 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 04:40:42AM -0400, eli wrote:
>> Something's been bothering me since I began contributing bandwidth to
>> the Tor network. Now that I've been running a bridge for awhile and feel
>> more or less confident of what I'm doing, I guess I can ask what may be
>> a dumb question.
>>
>> The elementary illustration of how the tor network carries msgs shows
>> Alice's machine connected to the first node of an OR path.
>>
>> Isn't it more accurate to show Alice's machine's first connection to be
>> to her ISP?
>>
>> And if this is true, is not the initial hop past the ISP's gateway a
>> place of no anonymity?
>>
>> If someone at the gateway were inclined to snoop, wouldn't be in effect
>> a MITM attack? - eliaz
> 
> First check out
> https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https
> and click on various combinations of "Tor" and "HTTPS".
> 
> Then read
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#KeyManagement
> 
> --Roger
> 
> _______________________________________________
> tor-talk mailing list
> tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
> 

_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk