Re: [tor-talk] Clarification of Tor's involvement with DARPA's Memex

[aka <akademiker1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

The common user does not apply to all threat models. If you are a high
volume recreational drug salesman, you must expect 0days and snitches.
If you however are merely a recreational drug consumer, Tor can cover
all of your security risks, because only low cost automated
investigation will be used against you. Traffic correlation and mass
surveilance are part of the NSA and will be applied to all kinds of
investigations once the fruit of the poisonous tree can be eaten.
Anonymization networks will be a substantial part of escaping
govermental terrorism if we won't be able to politicaly supress mass
surveilance and atm it very much appears we won't.

There are many ways to implement better anoynmity than Tor at a useful
scale, if low latency is sacrificed. Decentralized non-realtime network
protocols (maelstrom, bitmessage) are already beeing developed and might
work great for buying recreational drugs and watching censored adult
porn (which honestly is 90% of Tor's current userbase anyway)

Tempest wrote:
> Mirimir:
>> Nothing implemented at useful scale provides better anonymity than Tor.
>> I2P and JonDonym are interesting, but (other issues aside) are too
>> small. I believe that combining Tor with other systems, using nested
>> chains and remote workspaces, is the best approach available.
> 
> agreed. also, in how many different ways does it need to be repeated
> that, if you believe the nsa is your threat model, relying on tor alone,
> rather than a proper isolating disciplined opsec plan that doesn't
> merely put faith on technology, is a recipe for potential disaster? this
> nonsense has become beyond tedious. the fact that it is now personality
> driven speaks multitudes.
> 
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