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A brief response on TRUTHWORTHY

Fabian Keil <freebsd-listen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote

>I don't see the problem here. The option is called "AllowInvalidNodes" 
>not "DoNotOnlyUseTrusworthyNodes".
>You can't assume that every node not marked as invalid is trustworthy.

Hi Fabian,

I notice you snipped away quite a lot of what I wrote and I'd ask you to please read some of it again. If you have questions feel free to email me direct.


The term "trustworthy" comes from the passage in the manual, I didnt write it.


I quote

"AllowInvalidNodes entry|exit|middle|introduction|rendezvous|...
Allow routers that the dirserver operators consider invalid (not trustworthy or otherwise not working right) in only these positions in your circuits. The default is "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised."


Some of my text was in in colloquial English, sorry..

The term "muster" essentially means

 to gather together (usually an army or troop) 
So you would muster you men - OK so far?

In this context (tor) it just means anyone who can put together a server. It has no connotation on that servers ability for or against its accessing any keys or its ability at all. Im afraid you took a wrong turn there, sorry.


As for the Levels1..4 pushing folk away - on the contrary, everyone at the moment would slot into one or other of these categories. Just that some might not want to or get to the upper levels. There would be no loss of servers just the ability for the user to choose which level of security they prefer. Thats democratic yes/no?


 Of course you can still use your cryptic keys, if you want to, just like the internet uses ip addresses today. But for many internal torland websites, a userfriendly URL like alternative, supported by something akin to a torlandDNS system, would be an advantage to get the average man/woman in the street interested.

We are thinking BIG here, not a few thousand nodes, but a few hundred thousand perhaps a few million. A complete hidden internet, backed up by tens/thousands of terabytes of disk space, web sites served up/duplicated across the entire system. 

This is what ENTROPY (the network - is this dead yet?) does, approximately.


You know, you could always argue to do nothing, never create a Tor network, never use Tor, never encrypt, never invent guard nodes etc.

Its easy - just think of the exteme case when these defenses dont work and reason its not worth bothering to do in the first place.

But we dont - or at least not all of us do!

The thing about security is like anything in life - its an uphill struggle.

Always changing, always getting more difficult, as your adversary gets better.

Really just like LIFE and EVOLUTION, just like living viruses and bacterial adaptation to drugs etc.

Everytime you develop something, some monkey with a wrench comes along and makes all your efforts as nothing.

The ONLY way to stay on top of this is to get out there and do something!

We ALL know this - its our natural instinct, survival.

So to keep these flood servers at bay we need to erect barriers, hence my Levels1..4.

OK some Agent Blacks may be able to pass themselves off as "home" nodes but how many and will the tor community get wise to them?

The way it stands at the moment we do NOTHING!

So we will eventually be overrun, if we do nothing.

WHAT everyone needs to understand is that your adversary out there, who 
snoops on you, will ALREADY be watching and infiltrating the tor network, forums, mailing lists, dev teams and the likes. His/her interest is to snoop on you and what better way to do this than from the inside.

ASK yourselves - WHY is it that people keep posting on commonly (for most tor users?) understood problems of EXIT node logging of passwords etc, when a successful attack can only really be traced to a source by both entry and exit node logging and timing solutions, exactly what we are told is going on in the US. Why arent they screaming from the rooftops about these highvolume snoop nodes?

Once again to date we still have no server nicks having been circulated here for users to exclude. Again thats odd, dont you think? 

If I were a Tor adversary (a government say) I would first get control of as much of the development team as possible. I would put in a few trustable fast nodes - say by using university departments or the like (those who have an excuse to have high bandwidth/fast servers) - staffed with a few chosen men/women.

Then I would alter the code so that it was luke warm. If I was wanting to use it myself (with military strength) I would write the code with sections (functions/proceedures) which could easily (by a build server) be replaced with my hardening code versions. 

I would do my level best to stop any of those hardening techniques from getting into the actual code. But of course, some items I would have to add, say like guard nodes, because thats system wide.

Anyone suggesting hardening changes (particularly those I'd fenced off for the mil.) would be initially given the blarney and run about. For more serious cases I'd give them a roasting with my planted agents. You name it anything goes. If this fails I'd use my backup techniques of distraction, wrong footing - smoke and mirrors stuff that deludes and redirects the people away from the scent. If this fails then the ultimate solution would be used.. have a guess what that is?

Of course, this is hypothetical, what I would do if I was your adversary, what would you do if you were mine?

What I wouldnt do is sit there like a lone turkey getting shot up all day long, for days on end. And neither would you. So you understand.



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