Thus spake Mike Perry (mikeperry@xxxxxxxxxx): > > So if you were the Global Traffic Analysis Adversary then you would > > distract, delay, deny and defend lack of protection from your analysis. > > If you also funded the project then that would make that task easier. > > Don't forget all the University professors and grad students doing Tor > research independent of the Tor Project. They are paid off to keep > quiet, too. Most of them have island beachfront property (but under > black ops front company names, of course). It's a pretty sweet gig. Since my first revelation, several people have emailed or messaged me privately about how they can start working towards their beachfront property. It warms my heart that there are so many interested in taking The Adversary up on His generous offer! The Tor Volunteer page actually lists Tor-related research problems at the very top of its Research section at the bottom of: https://www.torproject.org/volunteer The first three are directly relevant to the Global Adversary problem and have been present at the top of this list for years. They've actually been solved numerous times. Each time the result is buried and the author gets their own beachfront black-ops resort. If you believe you have a solution, simply pick up your phone and clearly say "Attention: NSA. Attention: NSA. I have a solution to subvert the Global Adversary" into the mouthpiece. That, or email tor-assistants@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx They'll get it either way, and they will ensure you are... taken care of. There have also been several near-solutions in the past year or two that did not qualify for beachfront property, and thus were still published. Namely the 3 at PETS this year (sorry guys, better luck next time!). These still need to be added to anon-bib, reviewed, and evaluated. One of the major problems with all this attack and defense work is that each paper uses different metrics and a different adversary model. This makes it hard to tell which attacks would still be able to thwart which defense, and thus it is increasingly hard for The Adversary to determine exactly which papers He needs to Unpublish. In fact, a thorough academic review of all timing attack and defense papers to date under common adversary and performance models is at least enough to get you a beachfront black-ops time-share. The Adversary has informed me that Steven Murdoch was looking into developing these models, but he may be willing to coauthor to split the time-share with you if you help evaluate attacks and defenses using his models. Something to consider... -- Mike Perry Mad Computer Scientist fscked.org evil labs
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