Re: [tor-talk] [Tails-dev] tails_htp: exit node can fingerprint Tails users until exit node is changed

[intrigeri <intrigeri@xxxxxxxx>]

Hi,

adrelanos wrote (23 Jul 2012 01:36:26 GMT) :
> Because Tails doesn't use stream isolation and uses tails_htp over
> Tor, the exit node can see "Hello, this is a Tails user!". (Who else
> uses tails_htp over Tor.) The problem persists until the exit node
> is changed.

To be on the safe side, I'll assume the underlying unproven assumption
(that "tails_htp"'s fingerprint is that easily recognizable by an exit
node) is true, which is probably the case in the current state
of things.

> Proposed solution: use stream isolation, run tails_htp/wget over
> a different SocksPort.

Great idea, thanks!
I've added it to this ticket:
https://tails.boum.org/todo/separate_Tor_streams/
_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk