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[tor-talk] 'relay early' attack logging at the infrastructure level?



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quoting from [1]

> On July 30th, 2014 Anonymous said: Suppose my relay is running 
> 0.2.4.23, and suppose it's the middle hop between adversary's guard
>  node and adversary's hidden service directory. Will it kill
> circuits sending relay_early cells backwards? Or is that
> impossible, since it doesn't have the keys to decrypt that stream?
> 
> 
> On July 30th, 2014 arma said: It will indeed kill circuits if it 
> sees an inbound (towards the client) relay_early cell.
> 
> It doesn't have to decrypt the stream to see it, because whether a
>  cell is relay or relay_early is a property of the (per hop) link, 
> not a property of the (end-to-end) stream.

Does a patched relay also create a log entry as soon as it "kills" the
circuit or is logging only happening on tor instances acting as clients?



[1]
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack#comment-66769
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