Re: [tor-talk] TOR tried to take a snapshot of my screen

[Lee <ler762@xxxxxxxxx>]

On 8/22/14, no.thing_to-hide@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<no.thing_to-hide@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> I just downloaded the old version 3.6.3, the download link on
> http://www.neowin.net/news/tor-browser-bundle-363
> still works and leads to the file
> https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/3.6.3/torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe
>
> When I use jacksum on this file, the result is
>
> c8eb88324526d718b937b616c75d33a8 torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe

which does not match what I get

> This is another MD5 checksum than from the mentioned installer package
>
> 9529C5A633CF0CF6201662CA12630A04

which is what I get:
C:\temp\2do>md5 torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe
9529C5A633CF0CF6201662CA12630A04  torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe

which matches what the OP got
>>   The install package
>> torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe has the MD5 signature:
>> 9529C5A633CF0CF6201662CA12630A04

> I was not able to download the PGP signature of the file to verify its
> integrity.

I did:
/cygdrive/c/temp/2do
$ gpg --verify torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe.asc
gpg: WARNING: using insecure memory!
gpg: please see http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/faqs.html for more
information
gpg: Signature made Fri Jul 25 13:19:46 2014 EDT using RSA key ID 63FEE659
gpg: Good signature from "Erinn Clark <erinn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>"
gpg:                 aka "Erinn Clark <erinn@xxxxxxxxxx>"
gpg:                 aka "Erinn Clark <erinn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>"
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 8738 A680 B84B 3031 A630  F2DB 416F 0610 63FE E659


> One of us downloaded a wrong Tor installer package ...

Looks like it was you..

Regards,
Lee

>
> Best regards
>
> Anton
> - --
> no.thing_to-hide at cryptopathie dot eu
> 0x30C3CDF0, RSA 2048, 24 Mar 2014
> 0FF8 A811 8857 1B7E 195B 649E CC26 E1A5 30C3 CDF0
> Bitmessage (no metadata): BM-2cXixKZaqzJmTfz6ojiyLzmKg2JbzDnApC
>
>
>
> On 22/08/14 23:38, BM-2cVvnFWSftFx8dv12L8z8PjejmtrjYjnUY@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> I have TOR 3.6.3 installed in a Windows XP computer that is used
>> almost just for it with very few additional software installed. My
>> understanding is that a potential attacker will test his
>> exploit/approach against most of the security software available,
>> but possibly will not be able to test against ALL of them, so I
>> have a miscelaneous of popular and not popular security software
>> installed in the same computer; among them is a not so common anti
>> spyware called Zemana.
>>
>> I am using TOR browser and Zemana for years and I am familiar with
>> the behaviour of both. The TOR I am running has just the extensions
>> that comes with it; no additional extension was installed; no
>> plug-in is installed.
>>
>> I have proper licenses to run all the software, including Zemana,
>> so no crack or other suspicious tool was ever used. Zemana is a
>> quiet software and I can not remember about any single fake alert.
>>
>>
>> Few days ago, while browsing with TOR, I got a shocking alert from
>> Zemana: TOR TRIED TO TAKE A SNAPSHOT OF MY SCREEN.
>>
>>
>> As Zemana allow me, I did block such screen capture and TOR
>> crashed immediatly. By this crash I understand that TOR really
>> tried to capture my screen.
>>
>> I restarted TOR with a new identity, changed the identity many
>> times but TOR repeated the same behaviour a number of times with
>> the screen capture try-Zemana block-TOR crash. Change the identity
>> just does not works for such attacker.
>>
>> The script funcions were always blocked by NoScript 2.6.8.36.
>>
>> On the following days I used TOR again, without any change in my
>> system or software, accessing the same web sites but the attack no
>> longer took place.
>>
>>
>> I verified the MD5 signature for the TOR browser (firefox.exe) and
>> it is unchanged, i.e, it is as distributed by torproject.org
>>
>> The TOR 3.6.3 was downloaded from the TOR project web site, and not
>> from other servers. The install package
>> torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe has the MD5 signature:
>> 9529C5A633CF0CF6201662CA12630A04 I have the installer in my files
>> for any forensic work.
>>
>> I am sending some screens with the Zemana log, where is possible to
>> see the TOR MD5 signature (firefox.exe;
>> FC19E4AFB0E68BD4D25745A57AE14047) and the logged behaviour
>> ("screenlogger"), the TOR version, TOR button and the Zemana
>> version screens, and the extensions and plug-ins existing in my
>> TOR install (just to confirm that nothing strange is there). They
>> are available to download here:
>> http://www.datafilehost.com/d/dfb201d8 or
>> https://www.sendspace.com/file/6ygdl3
>>
>>
>>
>> Seems that TOR has hidden server capabilities, a back door that
>> allow a remote operator take snap shot of the screen and possible
>> perform other actions (record mic, turn on the webcam, ...).
>>
>>
>> I think TOR can protect the users from many enemies, but at the
>> same time it is a perfect tool to attract, identify and log very
>> specific (users) targets. This may explain also the, until now,
>> unclear role and objectives of the US goverment by funding the TOR
>> Project.
>>
>> Seems that hardly will be possible to identify suck attacker as it
>> probably comes from the TOR network itself, but I am considering a
>> trap/honney pot just in case this repeats.
>>
>>
>> I am an entusiast of privacy tools and TOR is not used for any kind
>> of unlawful purposes, is unlikely that I will attract attention
>> from public authorities and I am not worried with any data such
>> attacker eventually may have had access.
>>
>>
>> Hope this information may help to improve the TOR community
>> security and in some point in the future we will able to find a
>> solution for this back door.
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