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Re: [tor-talk] tor-talk Digest, Vol 43, Issue 67
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As long as the current guard model is in place then the relay could
probably tell if its a client vs bridge by the frequency of visit. I'm
assuming that a client visits one of its guard more often on average
then a random bridge would connect to that guard. There is probably
something in the code that tells the node which spot they are in.
The network would be slightly less secure because the chances of
having the first and last node would be improved, making correlation
attacks easier. It would how ever not be a third easier though,
because of Guards and exits wouldn't be used (much) as a middle node.
On 08/31/2014 05:00 AM, tor-talk-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> Let's imagine the Tor network is choosing 2 or 3 nodes, the first
> node would not be able to know it is the first one (because it does
> not know if the path is 2 or 3 nodes), it could check that the IPs
> are not belonging to the Tor network and then find out that it is
> the first one, but these IPs could be secret bridges, so it might
> not be really sure it is the first one.
> But maybe the benefit of such proposal (if proven safe) would be
> too small in the context of the Tor network compared to the
> traditionnal three nodes selection.
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