Re[2]: [rishab@dxm.org: Re: [silk] inside the Great FireWall...]

[Arrakistor <arrakistor@xxxxxxxxx>]

The  idea  is that the circuit coordination is distributed among three
layers.  The  first  tier  recieves  info  from  the Tor server saying
"hello,  I'm alive. Add me to the ultimate list". The second tier gets
regional  lists from the first tier, so nobody but tier 1 has a global
view. The third tier is the one that gets a request from the tor user,
specifying what kind of circuits it wants (fastest, country avoidance,
specific  servers, whatever) which queries the second tier as to which
might  be  the best nodes available to the request, to which the third
tier  then  calculates the possible circuits, and gives one to the tor
user at random.

What  happens if tier one is compromised? Everyone gets busted, unless
the Tor program itself has a way to authenticate if the first tier has
authority  and  a  true  identity.  And  naturally  there  is internal
verification of Tier 1, 2, and 3.

ST



Sunday, December 18, 2005, 9:32:34 AM, you wrote:


> What happens if your central coordinator - the one assigning circuits -
> is compromised?

> -Ben

> Arrakistor wrote:
>> The Chinese government will eventually try to block Tor. This is why I
>> think  the  next  design,  which  is  to  include a structure for mass
>> scaling,  should  not  distribute  a  directory  list, but only assign
>> circuits so the viewers can't get a whole view of the network.
>> 
>> ST
>> 
>> Sunday, December 18, 2005, 2:03:12 AM, you wrote:
>> 
>> 
>>>i don't know which version of tor is on torpark but i know the alpha
>>>version, the current and the previous to current ones would sometimes
>>>take several minutes building the circuits... this might be where the
>>>problem comes from perhaps? i wonder how long it will take for the
>>>chinese government to figure out that there is now yet another way to
>>>bypass their great firewall.
>> 
>> 
>>>On Sun, 18 Dec 2005 01:35:02 -0600, "Arrakistor" <arrakistor@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>said:
>>>
>>>>Yes,  it  works.  I've  read  the  websites  that  are  suggesting the
>>>>downloads.  For  most  it  works,  for  some,  when they first open it
>>>>firefox  times  out  so they assume it isn't working. However, it then
>>>>appears  to  work  just  fine.  I  should have this timeout fixed next
>>>>version.
>>>>
>>>>ST
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Saturday, December 17, 2005, 10:05:43 AM, you wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>I'm seeing plenty of Torpark chinese downloads. Do we know that these do
>>>>>actually work?
>>>>
>>>>>----- Forwarded message from Rishab Aiyer Ghosh <rishab@xxxxxxx> -----
>>>>
>>>>>From: Rishab Aiyer Ghosh <rishab@xxxxxxx>
>>>>>Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 15:59:52 +0000
>>>>>To: silklist@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>>Subject: Re: [silk] inside the Great FireWall...
>>>>>User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5.1i
>>>>>Reply-To: silklist@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>
>>>>>using torpark [1] i was able to google for "shanwei" which the
>>>>>IHT says i should not be able to do [2] and download pictures [3].
>>>>
>>>>>-rishab
>>>>>1.  well... after a few mins, the tor connection died. now can't
>>>>>connect to any site with tor. so i can't find the torpark url. but
>>>>>ssh still works.
>>>>>2. IHT.com, asia section,  "China's tight lid on village
>>>>>shootings", pg 7. from nytimes. sorry, can't connect now to find
>>>>>url, have paper in front of me. "until tuesday, web users who
>>>>>[searched  on google for] Shanwei, the city with jurisdiction over
>>>>>the village where the demonstration was put down, would find a
>>>>>handful of pages.... after a few screens of information unrelated to
>>>>>the incident, the browsers of users who persisted froze..."
>>>>>3. http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-12-10/35613.html
>>>>
>>>>>----- End forwarded message -----
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>-- 
>>>>Best regards,
>>>> Arrakistor                            mailto:arrakistor@xxxxxxxxx
>>>>
>>>
>>>-- 
>>>  Glymr Darkmoon
>>>  glymr_darkmoon@xxxxxxx
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 



-- 
Best regards,
 Arrakistor                            mailto:arrakistor@xxxxxxxxx