Am Samstag, den 06.12.2008, 19:49 -0500 schrieb Gregory Maxwell: > http://community.zdnet.co.uk/blog/0,1000000567,10009938o-2000331777b,00.htm?new_comment > > I've confirmed the reports of UK ISPs censoring Wikipedia using some > UK tor exists. I think it's time to find a better technical solution to deal with censorship in different countries. Censorship is increasing all around the world and we should be prepared that sooner or later nearly every country will censor the internet for different reasons (cp, intellectual property, politcal reasons, etc.) and in a different way. A perfect technical solution would make it possible to request any ressource as long as there is just one exit-node which isn't affected by censorship. But at the moment TOR-Nodes doesn't know which ressources are censored and which really doesn't exist, so it can happen that you use a circuit which is not able to bypass censorship. Putting them on the bad-exit-list is no solution, because first that way they are lost for the network for all requests which are not censored at all, and second the specific user has to know that the requested ressource does exist, which nodes are able to access it and how he can force TOR to do so. This could be done better: TOR itself should know which nodes are affected by censorship and use another for the specific request. The list could be auto-generated by the exit-nodes. For example an exit which gets back a 404 or a negative DNS-result could simply ask some other exit nodes (in a different country) to check if this is "real" or censorship. If last one, the specific request could be put on a list and published to the directory. Other TOR-Servers could use this list to check if they are also affected; clients would be able to check if the existing circuit is affected for the specific request and build up a different one. Not every censorship would be recognized this way, but for the other ones there could be a button implemented to TOR-Client. If pressed, the TOR-Exit is forced by the user to do the check. A nice side-effect is, that we get the neccessary data to check the censor which could be useful at least in democratic countries which have no public lists ('cause of index liborium prohibitum). So far, B. -- Surf anonymously and reach Hidden Services by using TOR, JonDos (JAP) and I2P with https://tor-proxy.net .
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