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[tor-talk] Tor Weekly News â December 17th, 2014

Tor Weekly News                                      December 17th, 2014

Welcome to the fiftieth issue in 2014 of Tor Weekly News, the weekly
newsletter that covers whatâs happening in the Tor community.

Solidarity against online harassment

Following âa sustained campaign of harassmentâ directed at a core Tor
developer over the past few months, the Tor Project published a
statement [1] in which it declared âsupport for her, for every member of
our organization, and for every member of our community who experiences
this harassmentâ: âIn categorically condemning the urge to harass, we
mean categorically: we will neither tolerate it in others, nor will we
accept it among ourselves. We are dedicated to both protecting our
employees and colleagues from violence, and trying to foster more
positive and mindful behavior online ourselvesâ We are working within
our community to devise ways to concretely support people who suffer
from online harassment; this statement is part of that discussion. We
hope it will contribute to the larger public conversation about online
harassment and we encourage other organizations to sign on to it or
write one of their own.â

As of this writing, there are 448 signatories to the statement,
including Tor developers and community members, academics, journalists,
lawyers, and many others who are lending their support to this movement
in its early stages. If you want to add your name to the list, please
send an email to tor-assistants@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

  [1]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/solidarity-against-online-harassment

Tails 1.2.2 is out

The Tails team announced [2] a pointfix release of the amnesic live
operating system. The only difference between this version and the
recent 1.2.1 release is that the automatic Tails Updater now expects a
different certificate authority when checking for a new Tails version.
As the team explained, âOn January 3rd, the SSL certificate of our
website hosting provider, boum.org, will expire. The new certificate
will be issued by a different certificate authority [â] As a
consequence, versions previous to 1.2.2 wonât be able to do the next
automatic upgrade to version 1.2.3 and will receive an error message
from Tails Upgrader when starting Tails after January 3rdâ.

This, along with a bug [3] that prevents automatic updates from 1.2.1 to
1.2.2, means that all Tails users will need to upgrade manually: either
to version 1.2.2 before January 3rd or (if for some reason that is not
possible) to version 1.2.3 following its release on January 14th.
Please see the teamâs post for more details and download instructions.

  [2]: https://tails.boum.org/news/version_1.2.2/
  [3]: https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/8449

Miscellaneous news

George Kadianakis, Karsten Loesing, Aaron Johnson, and David Goulet
requested feedback [4] on the design and code they have developed for
the Tor branch [5] that will enable the collection of statistics on Tor
hidden services, hoping to answer the questions âApproximately how many
hidden services are there?â and âApproximately how much traffic in the
Tor network is going to hidden services?â: âOur plan is that in
approximately a week we will ask volunteers to run the branch. Then in a
month from now we will use those stats to write a blog post about the
approximate size of Tor hidden services network and the approximate
traffic itâs pushing.â Please join in with your comments on the relevant
ticket [6]!

  [4]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007968.html
  [5]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/tor.git/log/?h=task-13192-5
  [6]: https://bugs.torproject.org/13192

Philipp Winter announced [7] an early version of âzoosshâ, which as the
name implies is a speedy parser written in Go that will help to âdetect
sybils and other anomalies in the Tor networkâ by examining Torâs
archive of network data. While it is not quite ready for use, âI wanted
folks to know that Iâm working on that and Iâm always happy to get
feedback and patches.â

  [7]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007973.html

Yawning Angel announced [8] the existence of âbasketâ, a âstab at
designing something that significantly increases Torâs resistance to
upcoming/future attacksâ, combining post-quantum cryptographic
primitives with âdefenses against website fingerprinting (and possibly
end-to-end correlation) attacksâ. You can read full details of the
cryptographic and other features of âbasketâ in Yawningâs post, which is
replete with warnings against using the software at this stage: âItâs
almost at the point where brave members of the general public should be
aware that it exists as a potential option in the privacy toolboxâ [but]
seriously, unless you are a developer or researcher, you REALLY SHOULD
NOT use âbasketâ.â If you are gifted or foolhardy enough to ignore
Yawningâs advice and test âbasketâ for yourself, please let the tor-dev
mailing list [9] know what you find.

  [8]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007977.html
  [9]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Sukhbir Singh and Arlo Breault requested feedback [10] on an alpha
version of Tor Messenger. It is an instant messaging client currently
under development that intends to send all traffic over Tor, use
Off-the-Record (OTR) encryption of conversations by default, work with a
wide variety of chat networks, and have an easy-to-use graphical user
interface localized into multiple languages.

 [10]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007981.html

TheCthulhu announced that his mirrors of two Tor network tools are now
available over Tor hidden services [11]. Globe [12] can be accessed via
http://globe223ezvh6bps.onion and Atlas [13] via
http://atlas777hhh7mcs7.onion. The mirrors provided by the Cthulhu run
on their own instance of Onionoo, so in the event that the primary sites
hosted by Tor Project are offline, both of these new mirrors should
still be available for use either through the new hidden services or
through regular clearnet access.

 [11]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035982.html
 [12]: https://globe.thecthulhu.com
 [13]: https://atlas.thecthulhu.com

The Tails team published [14] a signed list of SHA256 hashes for every
version of Tails (and its predecessor, amnesia) that it had either built
or verified at the time of release.

 [14]: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2014-December/007632.html

Vlad Tsyrklevich raised [15] the issue of the discoverability risk posed
to Tor bridges by the default setting of their ORPorts to 443 or 9001.
Using data from Onionoo and internet-wide scans, Vlad found that âthere
are 4267 bridges, of which 1819 serve their ORPort on port 443 and 383
serve on port 9001. Thatâs 52% of tor bridges. There are 1926
pluggable-transports enabled bridges, 316 with ORPort 443 and 33 with
ORPort 9001. Thatâs 18% of Tor bridgesâ I realized I was also
discovering a fair amount of private bridges not included in the Onionoo
data set.â Vlad recommended that operators be warned to change their
ORPorts away from the default; Aaron Johnson suggested [16] possible
alternative solutions, and Philipp Winter remarked [17] that while
bridges on port 443 âwould easily fall prey to Internet-wide scanningâ,
âthey would still be useful for users behind captive portalsâ and other
adversaries that restrict connections to a limited range of ports.

 [15]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007957.html
 [16]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007959.html
 [17]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007963.html

Alden Page announced [18] that development will soon begin on a
free-software tool to counteract âstylometryâ attacks, which attempt to
deanonymize the author of a piece of text based on their writing style
alone. âI hope you will all agree that this poses a significant threat
to the preservation of the anonymity of Tor usersâ, wrote Alden. âIn the
spirit of meeting the needs of the privacy community, I am interested in
hearing what potential users might have to say about the design of such
a tool.â Please see Aldenâs post for further discussion of stylometry
attacks and the proposed countermeasures, and feel free to respond with
your comments or questions.

 [18]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035989.html

Tor help desk roundup

Because Tor Browser prevents users from running it as root, Kali Linux
users starting Tor Browser will see an error message saying Tor should
not be run as root. 

In Kali, all userspace software runs as root by default. To run Tor
Browser in Kali Linux, create a new user account just for using Tor
Browser. Unpack Tor Browser and chown -R your whole Tor Browser
directory. Run Tor Browser as your created Tor Browser user account.

Upcoming events

  Dec 17 13:30 UTC | little-t tor development meeting
                   | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
  Dec 17 16:00 UTC | Pluggable transports meeting
                   | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
  Dec 22 18:00 UTC | Tor Browser online meeting
                   | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
  Dec 22 18:00 UTC | OONI development meeting
                   | #ooni, irc.oftc.net
  Dec 23 18:00 UTC | little-t tor patch workshop
                   | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
  Dec 27-30        | Tor @ 31st Chaos Communication Congress
                   | Hamburg, Germany
                   | https://events.ccc.de/congress/2014/wiki/Main_Page
  Jan 03 20:00 UTC | Tails contributors meeting
                   | #tails-dev, irc.oftc.net
                   | https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2014-December/007626.html

This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Harmony, TheCthulhu,
Matt Pagan, Arlo Breault, and Karsten Loesing.

Want to continue reading TWN? Please help us create this newsletter.
We still need more volunteers to watch the Tor community and report
important news. Please see the project page [19], write down your
name and subscribe to the team mailing list [20] if you want to
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 [19]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews
 [20]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
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