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Re: Compromised entry guards rejecting safe circuits (was Re: OSI 1-3 attack on Tor? in it.wikipedia)



Anon Mus schrieb:
Yes you are right factorising this is hard, but thats not what I've
been suggesting. What if every time you generated a pair of keys you stored the result somewhere!
Did you read Ben's comment about storage space for storing a huge number of
primes? It is quite impossible to store a significant percentage of the
keyspace of a key with 1024 bits. For even 1% you would have to store
2^1024/100 keys:
17976931348623159077293051907890247336179769789423065727343008115773\
26758055009631327084773224075360211201138798713933576587897688144166\
22492847430639474124377767893424865485276302219601246094119453082952\
08500576883815068234246288147391311054082723716335051068458629823994\
724593847971630483535632962422413721
And even if you could store that: there are much easier ways to compromise a
Tor user.
If breaking public/private key based encryption would be that easy, then
nobody would use it but working on better encryption schemes.

Dominik