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Re: Compromised entry guards rejecting safe circuits (was Re: OSI 1-3 attack on Tor? in it.wikipedia)

Anon Mus schrieb:
Yes you are right factorising this is hard, but thats not what I've
been suggesting. What if every time you generated a pair of keys you stored the result somewhere!
Did you read Ben's comment about storage space for storing a huge number of
primes? It is quite impossible to store a significant percentage of the
keyspace of a key with 1024 bits. For even 1% you would have to store
2^1024/100 keys:
And even if you could store that: there are much easier ways to compromise a
Tor user.
If breaking public/private key based encryption would be that easy, then
nobody would use it but working on better encryption schemes.