[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
--- On Wed, 2/18/09, slush <slush@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > As has been discussed to death here many times
> > already, there is no
> > way to inspect traffic prior to its exit without
> destroying the functional
> > protections of tor.
> Disagree. I wrote _port_ oriented QoS, not _content_.
> There can be config option to prioritize some port (port range) above
> other. Just because somebody want to support HTTP transfer than other,
> but he dont want to fully stop other services (torrents).
> Simply I imagine that in same style like ExitPolicy. Did
> you ask others, why
> are they using ExitPolicies? I dont think so. It is part of
> Tor and nobody
> (as far as I know) is against - because it is free choice
> of relay operator
> which kind of traffic he will support.
Yes, but exit nodes already no where your traffic is going (and on which port), middle and entrance nodes do not. If they did, it would defeat the purpose of tor I believe. Anonymity of requests is not limited to decoupling the destination IP from the user, but also to decoupling the type of traffic (i.e port) to the user, don't you think?