[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-talk] Who said it takes hours of latency to fix anonymity?
On Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:27:31 -0500
Roger Dingledine <arma@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 15, 2015 at 11:55:09AM +0100, carlo von lynX wrote:
> > I'm sorry to disturb with this, but I am being confronted with
> > hearsay about Roger D. having said that it would take latencies
> > in the order of hours to fully make communications impossible
> > to shape and correlate. And that hearsay is being purported as
> > generic for any kind of anonymization network. To me, if it is
> > true, this only makes sense applied to Tor's low latency approach
> > of things. A system that uses shaping-resistant fixed size packets
> > would not need latencies in the order of hours to be provably
> > successfully anonymizing even in the face of a pervasive global
> > attacker, and I presume several papers in anonbib propose viable
> > strategies concerning that. They are just too many to pick one to
> > start from. Am I missing a clue? I am so embarrassed to ask this,
> > I don't even feel like mailing Roger about it. I prefer having
> > more advanced questions to ask.
> It's actually worse than that -- we have no idea.
> I'd love to have a graph where the x axis is how much additional
> overhead (latency, bandwidth, whatever) we're willing to add, and the
> y axis is how much additional security (anonymity, privacy, whatever)
> we can get.
> Currently we have zero data points for this graph.
Isn't that interesting?
There's a whole 'industry' of 'academics' getting millions in
grants for 'researching' stuff and doing 'science', and yet
they don't provide any useful data. Interesting and cute.
> The NRL folks have a fun paper on how to turn a defense against
> passive timing attacks into a defense against active timing attacks:
> But you have to have a defense against passive timing attacks or their
> paper isn't useful to you yet.
> On the 'bad news' side, check out
> which shows reasonable scenarios against high-latency anonymity
> systems where the anonymity breaks down over time against a passive
> Such attacks work especially well against a world where you have
> "users" and you have "mixes", and the users don't participate
> consistently for the entire existence of the system.
> I've always been fond of
> as an example of what you can do if all your users are mixes and no
> users need to send or receive much traffic. But that paper also comes
> with many hidden assumptions, so be careful thinking the next step is
> to just build it.
> On the 'good news' side, consider that with millions of traffic flows,
> maybe you just have to drive the false positives up a little bit, and
> suddenly an attacker with only a partial view of the system can't
> trust his conclusions: see the "More precisely, it's possible that
> correlation attacks don't scale well because" paragraph in
> The PETS conference is where it's at in terms of progress so far. But
> it's been a while since things have moved forward. One next step might
> be to try to rephrase the question into something that somebody can
> answer better.
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to