Re: Maximize Anonymity Services but Minimize 'Abuse Like' Behaviors...

["Erik Heidt" <erik.heidt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Gregory and Ted -

Thanks for sharing your ideas. The challenge here runs deep...

At this time, I am measuring the 'effectiveness' of my contribution to Tor though the bandwidth that is used. In 2008, I had over a TBytes of bandwidth that I didn't use. (Purchased as a part of my server hosting service, linode.com). 

I have re-configured my relay to also accept inbound connections. I feel like this will have a low probability of creating friction between my service provider any myself, and as can be seen in the attached graph is using more bandwidth... So I am able to both contribute bandwidth to the project and avoid the problems associated with being an exit node.

I am considering running a separate exit note later - just getting my mind wrapped around all of this...

Again, thanks for your comments...

Erik

On Fri, Jan 2, 2009 at 1:25 PM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On Fri, Jan 2, 2009 at 11:43 AM, Erik Heidt <erik.heidt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
[snip]
> - Permitting exit to key informational resources (e.g. wikipedia services)

> - Permitting exit to top 5 or 10 web mail services (e.g. google mail,
> hotmail, yahoo, etc.)

And manage to make yourself look like someone doing a targeted MITM
attack on tor users.  :(

The above use cases should be handled by improving the exit enclave
support and convincing these sorts of major sites to run their own
exists.

If you'd like to cut abuse without looking like an attacker yourself
you're best off limiting your exit to ports which cause few abuse
complaints.  IRC and other chat protocols are probably good examples.

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