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Reliability of circuit extension if target server is running a Tor exit node

I read on <http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#ExitEavesdroppers>:

|Tor does provide a partial solution in a very specific situation, though.
|When you make a connection to a destination that also runs a Tor server,
|Tor will automatically extend your circuit so you exit from that circuit.
|So for example if Indymedia ran a Tor server on the same IP address as their
|website, people using Tor to get to the Indymedia website would automatically
|exit from their Tor server, thus getting *better* encryption and authentication
|properties than just browsing there the normal way.

How reliable is this supposed to work? For me it is working most of the time,
but quite often I get: - - [10/Jul/2006:20:55:54 +0200] "GET /pf-stats/ HTTP/1.1" 304 - "-" "Icke" - - [10/Jul/2006:20:56:00 +0200] "GET /pf-stats/pfstat-queues.png HTTP/1.1" 200 8112 "http://tor.fabiankeil.de/pf-stats/"; "Icke" - - [10/Jul/2006:20:56:00 +0200] "GET /pf-stats/pfstat-errors.png HTTP/1.1" 200 8118 "http://tor.fabiankeil.de/pf-stats/"; "Icke" - - [10/Jul/2006:20:56:00 +0200] "GET /pf-stats/pfstat-states.png HTTP/1.1" 200 8451 "http://tor.fabiankeil.de/pf-stats/"; "Icke" - - [10/Jul/2006:20:56:00 +0200] "GET /pf-stats/pfstat-packets.png HTTP/1.1" 200 7426 "http://tor.fabiankeil.de/pf-stats/"; "Icke" - - [10/Jul/2006:20:56:00 +0200] "GET /pf-stats/pfstat.png HTTP/1.1" 200 10048 "http://tor.fabiankeil.de/pf-stats/"; "Icke"

A foreign exit node is used for the first HTTP request,
the following requests use one of my own nodes.


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