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Re: Exit node connection statistics
- To: or-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: Re: Exit node connection statistics
- From: coderman <coderman@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 11:03:03 -0700
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On Mon, Jul 14, 2008 at 8:43 AM, <mplsfox02@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>... do you blindly trust all other Tor operators until they show some
> "bad" behaviour?
> [that's] nothing but security by obscurity.
this is why use of SSL/TLS over Tor is so strongly encouraged.
> Can you explain what the threat scenario is for what I'm doing?
> I'm not argument-resistant. So tell me your views.
the strongest argument is not for the privacy of those who exit your
node, but your own personal liability for knowing what exits your
node. see the Tor Legal FAQ:
Should I snoop on the plaintext that exits through my Tor relay?
No. You may be technically capable of modifying the Tor source code or
installing additional software to monitor or log plaintext that exits
your node. However, Tor relay operators in the U.S. can create legal
and possibly even criminal liability for themselves under state or
federal wiretap laws if they affirmatively monitor, log, or disclose
Tor users' communications, while non-U.S. operators may be subject to
similar laws. Do not examine the contents of anyone's communications
without first talking to a lawyer.