[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-talk] Traffic retention of TOR-Relays in Denmark

Thanks for your effords, but i think, we are talking about two 
different things. Of course, TOR does not want to hide that you use 

My worrys concern the TOR-Relays in Denmark. For example, there are 
20-30 Relays running in Denmark, some at home, some in Datacenters. 
If danish ISPs have to log each 500. Packet, and you accidently use 
a circuit consisting only in danish Servers (thats not very likely, 
but it could happen I think), they can track everything you have 
done using TOR, i think.

Is there anything in TOR that does prevent this problem? Actually, 
I think, that danish law affects only home consumers, no hosting-
centers. Do you think there are many, who run TOR-Servers at home 
using normal customer dsl-connections?

On Fri, 15 Jul 2011 21:44:03 +0200 Andrew Lewman 
<andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>On Friday, July 15, 2011 10:05:36 AM bemoo129@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>> Hello,
>> recently I read about the danish law to log every 500. IP-
>> which is on wire between Customer and ISP. Allthough this Law
>> doesnt affect hostet Servers, i thin it is dangerous for Tor-
>> which run on a normal PC at home.
>> What do you think abou this? If very much Packets from Tor-
>> are logged due this law, are danish-Tor servers now very 
>Let's take this apart into some easy to digest pieces.  
>First, I belive the law is to record IP packet header information, 
>not the 
>contents themselves.  While this is bad, it's the basis of traffic 
>analysis and 
>exactly one scenario in which Tor can defend the user. In part, 
>I'm basing my 
>understanding of this law from 
>The logs of a connection running a non-exit relay or bridge are 
>going to only 
>see encrypted traffic to and from the home computer.  The logged 
>packets may 
>show someone using Tor, but the traffic contained within is still 
>encrypted. The 
>connections will between Tor user and Tor relay, and Tor relay to 
>Tor relay.  
>Currently, Tor does not try to hide that you are using Tor.  Tor 
>scream 'I'm using Tor', but at the same time, if your adversary is 
>really closely, they can deduce you are using Tor.  The good news 
>is that 
>we're working on pluggable transports and obfuscating proxies to 
>hide the fact 
>that you are using Tor.  
>The logs of a connection running an exit relay is going to see 
>encrypted traffic 
>from other relays and whatever traffic exited from itself to a 
>destination.  The 
>logs will record lots of traffic from people other than the ISP 
>Some small percentage of this data may be illicit, as defined by 
>local laws.  
>This is the same risk for exit relays now.  
>Other information about protections tor provides against an 
>recording your traffic can be found at 
>pgp 0x74ED336B
>tor-talk mailing list

tor-talk mailing list