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Re: [tor-talk] Traffic retention of TOR-Relays in Denmark
Thanks for your effords, but i think, we are talking about two
different things. Of course, TOR does not want to hide that you use
My worrys concern the TOR-Relays in Denmark. For example, there are
20-30 Relays running in Denmark, some at home, some in Datacenters.
If danish ISPs have to log each 500. Packet, and you accidently use
a circuit consisting only in danish Servers (thats not very likely,
but it could happen I think), they can track everything you have
done using TOR, i think.
Is there anything in TOR that does prevent this problem? Actually,
I think, that danish law affects only home consumers, no hosting-
centers. Do you think there are many, who run TOR-Servers at home
using normal customer dsl-connections?
On Fri, 15 Jul 2011 21:44:03 +0200 Andrew Lewman
>On Friday, July 15, 2011 10:05:36 AM bemoo129@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>> recently I read about the danish law to log every 500. IP-
>> which is on wire between Customer and ISP. Allthough this Law
>> doesnt affect hostet Servers, i thin it is dangerous for Tor-
>> which run on a normal PC at home.
>> What do you think abou this? If very much Packets from Tor-
>> are logged due this law, are danish-Tor servers now very
>Let's take this apart into some easy to digest pieces.
>First, I belive the law is to record IP packet header information,
>contents themselves. While this is bad, it's the basis of traffic
>exactly one scenario in which Tor can defend the user. In part,
>I'm basing my
>understanding of this law from
>The logs of a connection running a non-exit relay or bridge are
>going to only
>see encrypted traffic to and from the home computer. The logged
>show someone using Tor, but the traffic contained within is still
>connections will between Tor user and Tor relay, and Tor relay to
>Currently, Tor does not try to hide that you are using Tor. Tor
>scream 'I'm using Tor', but at the same time, if your adversary is
>really closely, they can deduce you are using Tor. The good news
>we're working on pluggable transports and obfuscating proxies to
>hide the fact
>that you are using Tor.
>The logs of a connection running an exit relay is going to see
>from other relays and whatever traffic exited from itself to a
>logs will record lots of traffic from people other than the ISP
>Some small percentage of this data may be illicit, as defined by
>This is the same risk for exit relays now.
>Other information about protections tor provides against an
>recording your traffic can be found at
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