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Re: [tor-talk] new tld question

Other good news: no one registered for .onion, and it's going to be
several years until the next round of applications open.  Hopefully by
then, the process will be much smoother than this time around.

It's possible that next time around, Tor could apply for .onion, and
use it as a tor2web portal - but even if a lot of engineering effort
was put in[0] - a user visiting aabbccddee.onion in a normal web
browser would leak its DNS request, and an observer would know exactly
who they were trying to browse to.  That's not an issue with tor2web
mode, because it's only the HS, not the user, trying to be anonymous.
But trying to keep the user anonymous when visiting a .onion would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible.

But then again, on the flip side, if a user visits aabbccddee.onion
without using either a Tor DNs Proxy or TBB, that .onion DNS request
is still leaked.  So maybe the threat model becomes "We know we can't
protect users trying to visit a .onion without/with-misconfigured Tor,
so perhaps we want to at least enable the functionality, and hide what
the user is doing on the HS'.

Obviously there's a mess of holes with this, but I'm just thinking
aloud, and if the idea of exposing HS to the normal web through .onion
is desirable, we could start brainstorming in advance of the several
hundred pages of paperwork applying for a gTLD requires.


[0] If every DNS Request returned the IP of Entry Guard or similar
node, along with a DANE record, and a DPF policy of 'Always use SSL',
the client would connect to the IP hardcoded to use SSL with a
pre-arranged certificate.  They would then request the resource of the
hidden service (let's say '/').  That Entry Guard would hold all the
information: the client connecting, and the resource requested.  This
is obviously nowhere-near-ideal, but for a 'Let everyone use any
browser' situation, I'm not sure how to avoid it.  That Entry Guard
would then route the request through the Tor network, potentially
padding it.
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